EXHIBIT 3

	Page 1
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	x
4	IRVING H. PICARD, TRUSTEE
5	FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF B.
6	vs. CASE NO. 11-02149-cgm
7	BANQUE SYZ & CO., S.A.
8	x
9	IRVING H. PICARD, TRUSTEE
10	FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF B.
11	vs. CASE NO. 12-01205-cgm
12	MULTI-STRATEGY FUND LIMITED
13	x
14	
15	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
16	One Bowling Green
17	New York, New York 10004
18	
19	May 18, 2022
20	10:01 AM
21	BEFORE:
22	HON. CECELIA G. MORRIS
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
25	ECRO: Unknown

Page 2 Adversary Proceeding 11-02149-cgm, Irving H. Picard, Trustee 1 2 for the Liquidation of B vs. Banque XYZ & Co., SA Doc #148 Notice of Adjournment of Hearing RE: Pre-Trial 3 Conference Hearing not Held and Adjourned to 5/18/22 at 10 4 5 a.m. at Videoconference (ZoomGov) (CGM). 6 7 Doc #149 Motion to Dismiss Case/Motion and Notice of 8 Motion of Defendant Banque Syz SAs Motion to Dismiss the 9 Complaint (related document(s) 147, 1) filed by Richard B. 10 Levin on behalf of Banque SYZ & Co., SA with hearing to be 11 held on 5/18/22 at 10 a.m. at Videoconference (ZoomGov) 12 (CGM) Responses due by 3/29/22 13 14 Doc #153 Opposition/Trustee's memorandum of Law in 15 Opposition to Defendant Banque Syz SA's Motion to Dismiss 16 (related document(s)149) filed by Nicholas Cremona on behalf 17 of Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernie L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC and Bernard L. Madoff 18 19 20 Doc #156 Reply to Motion/Banque Syz SA's Reply to the 21 Trustee's Memorandum in Opposition to Banque Sys's Motion to 22 Dismiss the Complaint (related document(s) 149) filed by Richard B. Levin on behalf of Banque SYZ & Co., SA. 23 24 25

Page 3 1 Adversary proceeding: 12-01205-cgm; Irving H. Picard, 2 Trustee for the Liquidation of B v. Multi-Strategy Fund 3 Limited Doc #91 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding (related 4 5 document(s) 1) filed by Robert J. Lack on behalf of Multi-6 Strategy Fund Limited with hearing to be held on 5/18/22 at 7 10 a.m. at Videoconference (ZoomGov) (CGM) 8 9 RE: Doc #99 Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding Notice 10 of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (related 11 document(s)97) filed by Robert J. Lack on behalf of Multi-12 Strategy Fund Limited with hearing to be held on 5/18/22 at 13 10:00 a.m. at Videoconference (ZoomGov) (CGM) 14 15 Doc #108 Opposition/Trustee's memorandum of Law in 16 Opposition to Defendant Multi-Strategy Fund Limited's Motion 17 to Dismiss (related document(s)99) filed by David J. Sheehan on behalf of Irving H. Picard, Trustee for the Liquidation 18 19 of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC 20 21 RE: Doc #110 Reply Memorandum of Law of Defendant Multi-22 Strategy Fund Limited in Support of its Motion to Dismiss 23 the Amended Complaint (related document(s)99) filed by 24 Robert J. Lack on behalf of Multi-Strategy Fund Limited. 25 Transcribed by: Sheila Orms

	Page 4
1	APPEARANCES:
2	MAYER BROWN LLP
3	Attorneys for Lombard Odier
4	1221 Avenue of the Americas
5	New York, NY 10020
6	
7	BY: CHRISTOPHER J. HOUPT, ESQ.
8	MARC COHEN, ESQ. (ZOOM)
9	MARK G. HANCHET, ESQ. (ZOOM)
10	KEVIN C. KELLY, ESQ. (ZOOM
11	
12	KELLNER HERLIHY GETTY FRIEDMAN
13	Attorneys for Parson Finance Panama S.A.
14	470 Park Avenue South
15	7th Floor
16	New York, NY 10016-6819
17	
18	BY: DOUGLAS A. KELLNER, ESQ.
19	
20	CLIFFORD CHANCE US LLP
21	Attorneys for Dexia Banque Internationale a Luxembourg
22	31 West 52nd Street
23	New York, NY 10019
24	
25	BY: JEFF E. BUTLER, ESQ. (ZOOM)

	Page 5
1	CIRILLO LAW OFFICE
2	Attorneys for National Bank of Kuwait (NBK)
3	246 E. 33rd Street
4	New York, NY 10016
5	
6	BY: RICHARD A. CIRILLO, ESQ. (ZOOM)
7	
8	FRIEDMAN KAPLAN SEILER ADELMAN LLP
9	Attorneys for Multi-Strategy Fund Limited
10	7 Times Square
11	New York, NY 10036
12	
13	BY: ROBERT J. LACK, ESQ. (ZOOM)
14	JEFFREY C. FOURMAUX, ESQ. (ZOOM)
15	
16	PORZIO BROMBERG NEWMAN, P.C.
17	Attorneys for Luxalpha SICAV and its Liquidators, Alain
18	Rukavina
19	1675 Broadway
20	Suite 1810
21	New York, NY 10019
22	
23	BY: DEAN M. OSWALD, ESQ. (ZOOM)
24	
25	

	Page 6
1	BAKER HOSTETLER LLP
2	Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee
3	45 Rockefeller Plaza
4	New York, NY 10111
5	
6	BY: NICHOLAS CREMONA, ESQ. (ZOOM)
7	MATTHEW FEIL, ESQ. (ZOOM)
8	MATTHEW B. FRIEDMAN, ESQ. (ZOOM)
9	MARCELLA OLIVER, ESQ.
10	
11	GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
12	Attorneys for The Public Institution for Social
13	Security
14	One International Place
15	Suite 2000
16	Boston, MA 02110
17	
18	BY: ALISON T. HOLDWAY, ESQ. (ZOOM)
19	JOSEPH DAVIS, ESQ. (ZOOM)
20	LEO MUCHNIK, ESQ. (ZOOM)
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

```
Page 7
    WUERSCH GERING LLP
1
2
         Attorneys for Bank Vontobel
3
         100 Wall Street
4
          10th Floor
5
         New York, NY 10005
6
7
    BY: GREGORY F. HAUSER, ESQ. (ZOOM)
8
9
    JENNER BLOCK LLP
10
         Attorneys for "Defendant"
11
          1155 Avenue of the Americas
12
         new York, NY 10036
13
    BY: RICHARD LEVIN, ESQ. (ZOOM)
14
15
16
    JENNER BLOCK LLP
17
         Attorneys for "Defendant"
18
         353 N. Clark Street
19
         Chicago, IL 60654
20
21
    BY: VINCENT LAZAR, ESQ.
22
23
24
25
```

	Page 8
1	BECKER GLYNN MUFFLY CHASSIN HOSINSKI LLP
2	Attorneys for The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.
3	299 Park Avenue
4	New York, NY 10171
5	
6	BY: MICHAEL ZEB LADNSMAN, ESQ. (ZOOM)
7	
8	CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN HAMILTON LLP
9	Attorneys for CACEIS Bank Luxembourg
10	2112 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
11	Suite 1000
12	Washington, D.C. 20037
13	
14	BY: NOWELL BAMBERGER, ESQ.
15	
16	CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN HAMILTON LLP
17	Attorneys for CACEIS Bank Luxembourg
18	One Liberty Plaza
19	New York, NY 10006
20	
21	BY: JOSEPH M. KAY, ESQ.
22	THOMAS Q. LYNCH, ESQ.
23	RACHEL POLAN, ESQ. (ZOOM)
24	JEFFREY A. ROSENTHAL, ESQ.
25	ELIZABETH VICENS, ESQ.

Γ	1 9 10 01 200	
		Page 9
1	PROSKAUER ROSE LLP	
2	Attorneys for (Unknown)	
3	Eleven Times Square	
4	New York, NY 10036	
5		
6	BY: EHUD BARAK, ESQ.	
7	RUSSELL T. GORKIN, ESQ.	
8	ELLIOT R. STEVENS, ESQ.	
9		
10	ARNOLD PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP	
11	Attorneys for ASB Bank Corp.	
12	250 W. 55th Street	
13	New York, NY 10019-9710	
14		
15	BY: LUCAS B. BARRETT, ESQ. (ZOOM)	
16		
17	ARNOLD PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP	
18	Attorneys for ASB Bank Corp.	
19	601 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.	
20	Washington, D.C. 2001-3743	
21		
22	BY: ROSA J. EVERGREEN, ESQ.	
23		
2 4		
25		

1	1 9 11 01 200
	Page 10
1	ROPES GRAY LLP
2	Attorneys for Ropes Gray LLP
3	Prudential Tower
4	800 Boylston Street
5	Boston, MA
6	
7	BY: THANITHIA BILLINGS, ESQ.
8	ANDREW DEVORE, ESQ.
9	
10	WILLKIE FARR GALLAGHER LLP
11	Attorneys for Unknown
12	787 Seventh Avenue
13	New York, NY 10019-6099
14	
15	BY: LOUIS ALOYSIUS CRACO, ESQ.
16	
17	BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP
18	Attorneys for ZCM
19	55 Hudson Yards
20	New York, NY 10001
21	
22	BY: STEVEN FROOT, ESQ. (ZOOM)
23	
24	
25	

	Page 11
1	YOUNG CONAWAY STARGATT TAYLOR LLP
2	Attorneys for Irving H. Picard, Trustee
3	1270 Avenue of the Americas
4	Suite 2210
5	New York, NY 10020
6	
7	BY: CHRISTOPHER M. LAMBE, ESQ.
8	
9	SHEARMAN STERLING LLP
10	Attorneys for Unknown
11	599 Lexington Avenue
12	New York, NY 10022
13	
14	BY: RANDY LEWIS MARTIN, ESQ. (ZOOM)
15	
16	SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
17	Attorneys for Unknown
18	787 Seventh Avenue
19	New York, NY 10019
20	
21	BY: DAVID MOON, ESQ.
22	LUCIA M. RADDER, ESQ.
23	MARISSA ALTER-NELSON, ESQ.
24	
25	

	Page 12
1	ALLEGAERT BERGER VOTEL LLP
2	Attorneys for Unknown
3	111 Broadway
4	20th Floor
5	New York, NY 10006
6	
7	BY: LAUREN J. PINCUS, ESQ.
8	DAVID J. SHAIMAN, ESQ.
9	MICHAEL S. VOGEL, ESQ.
10	JOHN ZULACK, ESQ.
11	
12	SELEDY GAY ELSBERG PLLC
13	Attorneys for Fairfield Entities and Foreign
14	Representatives
15	1290 6th Avenue
16	New York, NY 10104
17	
18	BY: DOMINIC BUDETTI, ESQ.
19	DAVID ELSBERG, ESQ.
20	JORDAN GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.
21	RONALD KROCK, ESQ.
22	SAMUEL KWAK, ESQ.
23	JULIE SINGER, ESQ.
24	
25	

	Page 13
1	BROWN RUDNICK LLP
2	Attorneys for Unknown
3	1 Financial Center, Boston
4	Boston, MA 02111
5	
6	BY: MELANIE D. BURKE, ESQ. (ZOOM)
7	
8	LATHAM WATKINS LLP
9	Attorneys for Unknown
10	1271 Avenue of the Americas
11	New York, Ny 10020
12	
13	BY: COREY CALABRESE, ESQ.
14	
15	HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS NEW YORK LLP
16	Attorneys for Unknown
17	450 Lexington Avenue
18	14th Floor
19	New York, NY 10017
20	
21	BY: JONATHAN CROSS, ESQ.
22	MARK J. GOTTRIDGE, ESQ. (ZOOM)
23	
2 4	
25	

	Page 14
1	SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER HAMPTON, LLP
2	Attorneys for Meritz
3	30 Rockefeller Plaza
4	New York, NY 10012
5	
6	BY: MICHAEL T. DRISCOLL, ESQ.
7	
8	MCKOOL SMITH
9	Attorneys for Bank Julius Baer
10	395 9th Avenue
11	50th Floor
12	New York, NY 10001
13	
14	BY: ERIC HALPER, ESQ.
15	
16	SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER HAMPTON, LLP
17	Attorneys for Unknown
18	30 Rockefeller Plaza
19	New York, NY 10112
20	
21	BY: BLANKA K. WOLFE, ESQ. (ZOOM)
22	
23	
24	
25	

	Page 15
1	LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP
2	Attorneys for Bureau of Labor Insurance
3	One Lowenstein Drive
4	Roseland, NJ 07068
5	
6	BY: NICOLE M. FULFREE, ESQ. (ZOOM)
7	
8	BECKER GLYNN MUFFLY CHASSIN HOSINSKI LLP
9	Attorneys for The Sumitomo Trust and Banking Co., Ltd.
10	299 Park Avenue
11	New York, NY 10171
12	
13	BY: TARA Q. HIGGINS, ESQ. (ZOOM)
14	
15	DAVIS GILBERT LLP
16	Attorneys for Natixis
17	1675 Broadway
18	New York, NY 10019
19	
20	BY: ADAM M. LEVY, ESQ. (ZOOM)
21	HENRY SEIJI NEWMAN, ESQ. (ZOOM)
22	
23	
24	
25	

Page 16 1 SEWARD KISSEL 2 Attorneys for Arden Endowment Advisers Limited 3 One Battery Park Plaza 4 New York, NY 10004 5 BY: M. WILLIAM MUNNO, ESQ. (ZOOM) 6 7 8 WESTERMAN BALL EDERER MILLER ZUCKER SHARFSTEIN 9 Attorneys for Arden Asset Management Inc. 10 1201 RXR Plaza 11 Uniondale, NY 11556 12 13 BY: MICHAEL B. WEITMAN, ESQ. (ZOOM) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Page 17 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. 3 MR. CREMONA: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Just for the record, the first matter that we have on is 10-04289, Picard versus John Fujiwara and 5 6 that one, there's been a certificate filed of no objection; 7 is that correct? 8 MR. CREMONA: Good morning, Your Honor, this is 9 Nicholas Cremona appearing on behalf of the Trustee. That's 10 correct, Your Honor. After the objection deadline on 11 Friday, we submitted a certificate of no objection and a 12 proposed order granting the motion to enforce the settlement 13 agreement which remains in default. 14 THE COURT: Very good. I will -- when it comes 15 through the system, I'll -- we'll sign off on it, thank you. 16 MR. CREMONA: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: 12-01205, Irving Picard, the Trustee versus Multi-Strategy Funds Limited, 12-01205, state your 18 19 name and affiliation. 20 MR. LACK: Good morning, Your Honor, Robert Lack 21 of Friedman Kaplan Seiler and Adelman for defendant Multi-22 Strategy Limited. 23 THE COURT: I need to have everybody put their 24 appearance on first. 25 MR. LACK: Oh, yes. And also with me today is my

Pg 19 of 203 Page 18 1 partner Jeffrey Fourmaux, who will present part of the 2 argument for the defendant. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Very good. MR. FEIL: Good morning, Your Honor, Matthew Feil 5 for -- from Baker Hostetler for the Trustee and my colleague 6 Matthew Friedman will also be appearing for the Trustee. 7 THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Lack, it's your 8 motion. 9 MR. LACK: Thank you, Your Honor. This is the 10 first motion to dismiss in a series of approximately 80 11 proceedings brought by the Trustee to recover transfers from offshore Madoff feeder funds to foreign transferees. 12 13 The Trustee alleges that the transfers constituted 14 subsequent transfers of customer property, initially 15 transferred to those feeder funds by Bernard L. Madoff 16 Investment Securities LLC or BLMIS, which I'll refer to 17 sometimes as Madoff. 18 The legal issues we will argue today are common to 19 nearly all the cases. I will address two of them, the 20 applicability of the safe harbor in Section 546(e) in the 21 Bankruptcy Code and the Trustee's failure to plausibly 22 allege the transfer at issue constituted customer property. My partner, Jeff Fourmaux will address the lack of personal 23

In the case of Multi-Strategy, the issues are

jurisdiction.

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presented exceptionally clearly. Multi-Strategy is an investment fund established in the Cayman Islands and operated out of Canada.

In the Trustee's amended complaint filed in February of this year, the Trustee seeks to recover a single transfer of \$25.8 million made from Fairfield Sentry to Multi-Strategy on March 15th, 2005.

The amended complaint was filed after MultiStrategy made its initial motion to dismiss. The Trustee
does not seek any discovery in connection with this motion
and does not seek leave to amend.

In this case, as in many others, the Trustee has given the back of his hand to Multi-Strategy's motion.

Section 546(e) does not apply, he says, because the initial transferee, Sentry, is alleged to have had actual knowledge of Madoff's fraud.

The Trustee denies any obligation to link the initial transfers from Madoff to Sentry to the subsequent transfer from Sentry to Multi-Strategy. And he says that Multi-Strategy's intent that its investment in Sentry would ultimately be invested in the U.S. market is enough to establish jurisdiction.

All of these Trustee assertions are wrong, and fly in the face of Judge Rakoff's opinion in Cohmad, this Court's decision in Fairfield Investment Fund, the Supreme

Court's decision in Iqbal, Twombly and Walden, and many others.

Now, we start with Section 546(e). Section 546(e) prevents the Trustee from avoiding certain initial transfers. The Trustee does not dispute that it applies by its terms to the initial transfer alleged to have occurred from Madoff to Sentry in this case.

That is, he does not dispute that Madoff was a stockbroker, that Sentry was a financial institution and that the transfer was a settlement payment or in connection with a securities contract. He does not dispute that that transfer that Multi-Strategy was made more than two years before the petition date.

The real issue on this motion is not whether the safe harbor applies to the initial transfer. It clearly does. But which transferees can invoke it, whether the actual knowledge of the initial transferee can be used to strip the safe harbor protection from a subsequent transferee that does not have actual knowledge?

The Trustee's argument against the safe harbor has two steps. First, he says that under Cohmad, Section 546(e) cannot be invoked by the initial transferee, Sentry, because of Sentry's alleged actual knowledge of Madoff's fraud.

And second, the Trustee goes on to argue because the safe harbor cannot be invoked by the initial transferee,

it cannot be invoked by the subsequent transferee, Multi-Strategy, either, even though Section 546(e) literally applies and Multi-Strategy is not alleged to have had actual knowledge of the fraud.

The Trustee's second step is not supported by

Cohmad. Quite the opposite. Cohmad stands for the

proposition that a transferee's ability to invoke the safe

harbor, depends on whether that transferee, that is the

defendant being sued had actual knowledge of the fraud.

At the start of his opinion, Judge Rakoff weighs out his holding in two paragraphs. First, where exception 546(e) would otherwise apply, the initial transferee cannot invoke it, if the initial transferee had actual knowledge of the fraud.

And second, where 546(e) would otherwise apply, the subsequent transferee cannot invoke it if the subsequent transferee had actual knowledge of the fraud.

No where does Judge Rakoff say that where Section 546(e) would otherwise apply, the subsequent transferee cannot invoke it if the initial transferee had actual knowledge of the fraud. And there's no reason to believe that Judge Rakoff would deny an otherwise applicable safe harbor to an innocent subsequent transferee. His stated reason for his holding in Cohmad was that Section 546(e) is designed to protect the legitimate expectations of parties

to securities contracts. And that if a transferee actually knew that there was no securities contract between -- because Madoff who is not trading securities, there's no reason to give that transferee the benefit of the safe harbor.

But there, there is no allegation that MultiStrategy knew Madoff was not trading securities. They had
every reason to believe that any transfer from Madoff to
Sentry was in connection with a securities contract, either
between Madoff and Sentry or between Sentry and MultiStrategy. Cohmad's rationale supports Multi-Strategy's
ability to invoke the safe harbor.

Now, this Court adopted this approach in Fairfield

Investment Fund when it focused on the actual knowledge of

the various subsequent transferees in deciding whether to

dismiss the subsequent transfer claims against it.

In the case of Corina Noel Piedrahita, the Court found that there were no allegations that she had actual knowledge of the fraud and dismissed the subsequent transfer claim against her.

Had the Trustee's theory been correct and the actual knowledge of Sentry had been sufficient to deny subsequent transferees the ability to invoke the safe harbor, this Court would have refused to dismiss the claim against Ms. Piedrahita since it found that Sentry's actual

knowledge had been adequately alleged. But the Court dismissed Ms. Piedrahita because she lacked actual knowledge. A consistent approach requires dismissal of Multi-Strategy here.

The Trustee argues that allowing the subsequent transferee to invoke the safe harbor when the initial transferee cannot, is somehow treating them unequally, not so.

The same rule from Cohmad applies to both.

Transferees with actual knowledge cannot avail themselves with the safe harbor. As Judge Rakoff put it in the passage Your Honor quoted in Fairfield Investment Fund, quote, if the Trustee sufficiently alleges that the transferee from whom he seeks to recover a fraudulent transfer knew of Madoff's securities fraud, that transferee cannot claim the protections of Section 546(e), safe harbor, unquote.

Here, the Trustee does not allege that MultiStrategy knew of Madoff's fraud. Multi-Strategy thus can
invoke the safe harbor, even if Sentry cannot. Indeed,
allowing the Trustee's claim against Multi-Strategy would be
treating innocent transferees unequally.

All innocent initial transferees that received transfers more than two years before the petition date, have been been dismissed based on the safe harbor as a result of the Second Circuit's decision in Fishman.

Page 24 1 It would be bizarre and unjust for innocent 2 subsequent transferees to be denied the use of the safe harbor, where they had no direct dealings with Madoff and 3 thus were further removed from Madoff's wrongdoing than the 4 5 initial transferees. 6 If Your Honor has no questions on this, I'll 7 proceed to customer property. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. LACK: Because --10 THE COURT: One thing I did want to say is if you 11 emphasize what you've written and don't repeat yourself, it 12 helps me. 13 MR. LACK: Oh, yes, absolutely, Your Honor. And I 14 have --15 THE COURT: (indiscernible), right? 16 MR. LACK: Yeah, absolutely. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 18 MR. LACK: Okay. On the issue of customer 19 property, the Trustee claims that because Sentry invested 20 nearly all its money in BLMIS, all redemptions from Sentry 21 had to be Madoff customer property. 22 The problem is that the Trustee's own pleading 23 show that this is implausible and in the case of a single transfer to Multi-Strategy impossible. 24 25 This is not a matter of expert opinion, but simple

Page 25 arithmetic. The first transfers from Madoff to Sentry within the six year period preceding the petition date began on May 9th, 2003. On May 9th, July 11th, and July 22nd, 2003 BLMIS sent \$40 million, \$55 million and \$25 million respectively to Sentry, for a total of \$120 million. There were no further transfers from Madoff to Sentry in the nearly two years from that time until Multi-Strategy received its redemption on March 15th, 2005. Now, how do we know this on this motion to dismiss? It's in the tables attached as exhibits to the amended complaint that the Trustee filed against Multi-Strategy. The Trustee has filed complaints alleging that during May 2003 and the following months, Fairfield Sentry transferred hundreds of millions of dollars of Madoff customer property to Fairfield affiliated entities and Fairfield investors. Simply adding these up -- yes. And simply adding these up, as I did in my declaration shows that all the Madoff money was gone by the time Multi-Strategy received its redemption in March 2005. The money Multi-Strategy received could not have

come from Madoff. It had to have come from other Sentry

investors.

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In Multi-Strategy's case, the Court doesn't need to look beyond the Trustee's amended complaint against Multi-Strategy and the documents it incorporates by reference.

The Trustee's second amended complaint against

Fairfield Sentry which is incorporated by reference into the

Trustee's amended complaint against Multi-Strategy was more

than \$300 million of transfers from Sentry to a Fairfield

affiliated entities between May 9th, 2003 and March 14th,

2005. Far more than the \$120 million Madoff sent to Sentry.

It is simply not plausible on the face of the Trustee's

amended complaint against Multi-Strategy that Multi-Strategy

received any Madoff customer property in the single

redemption on March 15th, 2005.

Now, the Trustee says -- the Trustee says that our exhaustion argument belies on the factual assumption that every transfer from Sentry that preceded ours was sourced solely by customer property. He says that on page 30 of his opposing brief.

On this motion, we are entitled to this assumption because the Trustee alleges precisely this in his complaints. The Trustee alleges in his complaints that the entire subsequent transfers to each defendant consisted of customer property, not that only some of them did.

For example, the amended complaint against Multi-

Strategy alleges in paragraph 2 that quote, the Trustee seeks to recover a single subsequent transfer of \$25,763,374 in BLMIS customer property.

In paragraph 331 of the Trustee's second amended complaint against Fairfield Sentry, he alleges that all subsequent transfers quote, were and remain customer property. And indeed, in the amended complaint, the trustee filed yesterday, against Standard Charter Financial Services Luxembourg, he seeks to recover \$289 million in alleged subsequent transfers. And alleges in paragraph one that all \$289 million is quote, BLMIS customer property, unquote.

Thus, holding the Trustee to what he alleged in his complaints, all of the Madoff money that was received before March 15th, 2005, had to have been distributed by Sentry to others before Multi-Strategy received its redemption.

This is not a matter of tracing of commingled property. At the time of Multi-Strategy's redemption, there was no commingling with Madoff and non-Madoff money because there was no Madoff money left in Sentry.

None of the cases cited by the Trustee involved a situation in which customer property had been exhausted or in which nearly two years had passed between the last alleged initial transfer and the alleged subsequent transfer.

As we noted in our reply brief, those cases involve linkages between the initial and subsequent transfers that were apparent on the face of the pleadings, with corresponding amounts within short periods of time. The Trustee made no attempt to show any such linkage here. Indeed, the Trustee does not dispute that he has sued for billions of dollars more in subsequent transfers than Sentry ever received from Madoff. His allegations that these subsequent transfers all are customer property simply cannot be true. If following Twombly required the Trustee to show how each transfer could plausibly be customer property. He has not done so even though he has had access to Sentry's books and records for more than a decade. In the case of a single transfer to Multi-Strategy he failed to show any linkage to customer property in his amended complaint even after his failure was highlighted in our initial motion to dismiss. His claim should therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. At this point, Your Honor, unless you have some questions about the customer property, I'll ask Mr. Fourmaux to address personal jurisdiction. THE COURT: Very good, Mr. Fourmaux. MR. FOURMAUX: Good morning, Your Honor, Jeff Fourmaux, Friedman Kaplan Seiler and Adelman for defendant

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Multi-Strategy Fund. I'll be addressing why there's no personal jurisdiction here.

The basic jurisdictional facts are undisputed.

I'll just mention the highlights. Multi-Strategy is an investment fund organized in the Cayman Islands with its principal place of business in Canada. Multi-Strategy did not negotiate or execute its subscription agreements or its redemption requests with Sentry in the United States. Those documents were all signed in Canada and faxed to the Netherlands.

The subscription and redemption payments went by wire transfer from Multi-Strategy's bank account in Canada to Sentry's bank account in Ireland and vice versa.

Now, the Trustee makes four arguments for specific jurisdiction, but on the facts here, none of them establishes a prima facie case, either alone or in combination.

First, there's the Trustee's lead argument for specific jurisdiction. That's the Trustee's knowledge and intent theory and it's fundamentally contrary to controlling appellate authority.

The Trustee alleges that Multi-Strategy bought shares of Sentry knowing and intending that Sentry would invest Multi-Strategy's money with Madoff in New York and that Madoff purported to trade in U.S. securities.

The Trustee asserts that quote, by investing in this way, defendant purposely undertook investment activities in the United States, end quote. That's the amended complaint, paragraph 100. That is a theory of imputation, Your Honor.

The Trustee asks the Court to treat Sentry's act of investing Multi-Strategy's money with Madoff in New York as being Multi-Strategy's own action in New York. By doing that, the Trustee seeks to impute Sentry's New York contact to Multi-Strategy. But neither the Trustee nor the BLI opinion he relies on, cites any precedent or authority for his knowledge and intent theory of imputation.

Why not? Because the Trustee's theory is contradicted by well established principles. First, specific jurisdiction must be based on a defendant's own contacts with the forum, not on the plaintiff's, or any third party's contacts with the forum. That's the core principle confirmed in the Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Walden v Fiore.

Second, federal law and New York law both respect the separate legal personalities of corporation and shareholder when determining jurisdiction. And that's what Sentry and Multi-Strategy are, corporation and shareholder.

The upshot of those two principles is that neither federal law from the Second Circuit nor New York law will

impute a corporation's jurisdictional contacts to a shareholder except in two narrow well defined circumstances.

The first exception is that the corporation is an alter ego or a mirror department of the shareholder. But the Trustee's claiming -- is not claiming there's any ground for piercing the corporate veil between Multi-Strategy and Sentry.

The second exception is agency. There's a very well established test for that, which the Trustee acknowledges his brief at page 17. It requires, among other things, that the shareholder must have some control over the corporation in its conduct of the transaction in New York. But the Trustee concedes that Multi-Strategy did not have control over Sentry's investments with BLMIS.

Instead, the Trustee alleges that quote, personnel at FGG's New York headquarters maintained final control of Fairfield Sentry's investments at BLMIS, end quote. That's amended complaint, paragraph 62.

So because the Trustee does not allege all the required elements of either alter ego or agency, Sentry's contacts with New York cannot be imputed to Multi-Strategy.

Now, nonetheless, the Trustee urges the Court to follow the result in Judge Lifland's decision in Picard v Bureau of Labor Insurance from 2012. That's -- we'll call that BLI for short. And he asked on that basis to impute

Sentry's New York contacts to Multi-Strategy just based on insufficient elements of knowledge and intent.

The controlling Second Circuit and New York Court of Appeals law on imputation was never briefed by either party in BLI. There were only two pages briefing on specific jurisdiction by the defendant in that case. And that briefing made it appear as if the dispositive issue was just a factual question on whether the defendant's funds ended up in the Madoff accounts, merely as a result of happenstance or coincidence, or whether the Trustee adequately alleged the defendant knew and intended all along that Sentry would place its money with Madoff in New York.

It was in that context, Your Honor, that the BLI court only responding to the arguments actually made to it held that personal jurisdiction would be found because the defendant knew and intended that Sentry would invest its money with Madoff in New York.

But long established controlling case law that was never briefed to or addressed by BLI shows why knowledge and intent are not enough. We discuss it in our moving brief.

In opposition, the Trustee does not dispute that Multi-Strategy identified the controlling appellate court authority. The Trustee does not dispute that imputation requires alter ego or agency and the Trustee did not dispute that he has not alleged facts showing either. He does not

cite any appellate case law permitting imputation based on knowledge and intent alone. Those concessions are dispositive, Your Honor.

Because BLI assumed, without addressing, that the Trustee's theory of knowledge and intent was legally sufficient and because that theory is, in fact, contrary to controlling legal framework, this Court respectfully repeat BLI's result here.

Unless Your Honor has any questions, I'll move to the second. So the second argument is -- relates to communications from Canada to New York.

The Trustee alleges that Multi-Strategy representatives in Canada sent e-mails and made phone calls to Fairfield Greenwich employees in New York. The Trustee does not allege that any transaction was conducted or negotiated through those communications. Without that, such communications do not constitute transacting business in New York under well established authority that we cited in our briefs.

The Trustee also points to the fact that shortly after Multi-Strategy first purchased shares in Sentry in July 2004, Multi-Strategy representatives visited New York and while here, having an introductory meeting with some Fairfield Greenwich employees. Again, there's no allegations that any transaction was conducted or negotiated

at that meeting. And without any transaction that one meeting does not constitute purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in New York.

In addition to that, the Trustee's claim does not arise out of or relate in any way to any of the alleged telecommunications or the single meeting.

Third, the Trustee has an argument based on the subscription fees. The Trustee contends that Multi-Strategy's subscription agreements with Sentry. In them, Multi-Strategy agreed to a choice of New York law and consented to personal jurisdiction of New York courts with respect to certain matters.

But as noted in our briefs, there's controlling precedence from UK Privy Council in Migani and from this Court in Fairfield I, that foreclosed that argument.

And then last, Your Honor, the Trustee's last argument of personal jurisdiction relates to correspondent bank accounts. There's a few essential facts that are needed to put that argument in context.

Sentry had a bank account at the Dublin, Ireland branch of Citco Bank, which is a Dutch bank. Multi-Strategy had a bank account at a Montreal, Canada branch of Desjardin, which is a Canadian Bank. Like most non-U.S. banks, Citco Bank and Desjardin hold and use correspondent accounts at U.S. banks to facilitate U.S. dollar wire

transfers.

The Trustee contends that Multi-Strategy
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in New York because Sentry and Multi-Strategy were
customers of banks, that in turn, used correspondent
accounts in New York to facilitate U.S. dollar wire
transfers between their accounts in Ireland and Canada.
There is no case law support for the Trustee's assertion,
Your Honor.

The Trustee cites cases on New York bank accounts.

But in all of them, it's the defendant that selects, holds,

controls and uses the New York bank account and that's a

basis for finding that the defendant was transacting

business in New York in those cases.

In situations like we have here, where the defendant is just a customer of a non-party foreign bank that has and uses a correspondent account in New York, that does not count as bank customer itself doing business in New York.

Judge Valerie Caproni, at the district court in the 2021 Berdeaux OneCoin case that we cited in our reply brief surveyed the law in this area just last fall and concluded that there is no authority, quote, standing for the principal that a non-domiciliary individual defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction in New York under

Pg 37 of 203 Page 36 Section 302(a)(1) because the non-domiciliary moved money between foreign bank accounts, that the transfer passing through New York via a correspondent account, end quote. I'd say, moreover, the Trustee's claims do not arise out of or relate in any way to the fact that wire transfers between Ireland and Canada were routed through New York midway. In closing, Your Honor, I note that Multi-Strategy moved to dismiss the Trustee's original complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction on the same grounds in January of this year, 2022. The Trustee responded to Multi-Strategy's original complaint by filing the amended complaint in February. But the amended pleading doesn't cure any of the jurisdictional facts that we showed in January. So I would submit, respectfully, Your Honor, that the Court should dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without leave to amend. If Your Honor has questions, I'd be happy --THE COURT: No. MR. FOURMAUX: -- to address them, otherwise, I would ask that I be permitted some time in rebuttal after the Trustee's counsel speaks. THE COURT: Very good. MR. FOURMAUX: Thank you.

Mr. Feil, before you begin, I have one

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Page 37 1 The -- Kingate is mentioned and I'm -question for you. 2 since I'm new to this case, what happened with Kingate? 3 MR. FEIL: I'm sorry, Kingate is mentioned in what 4 capacity, Your Honor? THE COURT: Well, you had it in some of the things 5 6 -- maybe it wasn't -- maybe it's in the other case, not this 7 one. Maybe it's in the other case. 8 MR. FEIL: I think it's in the other case, Your 9 Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Very good, we'll talk about it 11 then. Thank you. 12 MR. FEIL: Okay. I will be responding to Mr. 13 Lack's arguments concerning Section 546(e) and the 14 plausibility of the Trustee's transfer claim. And then my 15 colleague, Mr. Friedman will address why this Court has 16 jurisdiction over the defendant. 17 Your Honor, I'd like to begin by discussing the 18 defendant's right to assert the Section 546(e) defense in 19 this action to recover a subsequent transfer and how prior 20 decisions of the district court and the Bankruptcy Court in 21 this liquidation made clear that the Trustee is not required 22 to allege that the subsequent transferees had actual 23 knowledge. Well, Your Honor has already ruled that the 24 Trustee has sufficiently pled that the initial transferee 25 has actual knowledge.

Defendant is effectively arguing that it has an independent right to assert the 546(e) defense, even whereas here, the initial transferee is barred from asserting the defense. That is wrong.

Defendant has a right to raise an indirect defense to avoidance by stepping into the shoes of the initial transferee and asserting the defenses available to the initial transferee. That right, however, extends only so far as the initial transferee could itself raise the defense here.

Where the initial transferee is itself barred from raising 546(e) as a defense, then too -- so too as the subsequent transferee by stepping into its shoes. Thus Your Honor's finding that the Trustee has pled Sentry's actual knowledge forecloses the application of 546(e) at the pleading stage in this action.

And there's no reason to consider whether the defendant has actual knowledge for purposes of 546(e) to decide the motion. This is evident from the consolidated decisions of the district court in this liquidation.

Your Honor, the defendant talked about the Cohmad decision and I'd like to just discuss that a little bit. In April 2013, the district court issued that decision explaining how Section 546(e) should be applied as to the Trustee's claims against initials and subsequent

transferees.

The decision followed a bottom line order from the district court which Multi-Strategy has block quoted in its reply. It argues that the bottom line order requires the Trustee to plead subsequent transferee's actual knowledge in this 550 recovery action, despite the avoidability of the initial transfers.

I'd like to walk the Court through the Cohmad decision in the bottom line order and certain related case law to show that there's only one part of the Cohmad decision where the district court addresses how and when a subsequent transferee's actual knowledge is relevant. And to show how the defendant is misinterpreting that part of the decision.

Both the decision and the bottom line order establishes a subsequent transferees' actual knowledge is only relevant when the initial transferee is innocent, and can itself assert a 546(e) defense to avoidability.

Before we examine the bottom line order, I'd like to turn the Court's attention to the part of the Cohmad decision where the district court specifically addresses the subsequent transferee's limited right to assert the defense. And that's on page 7, Your Honor, of that opinion.

The district court addresses the question before Your Honor, a subsequent transferee's right to raise the

546(e) defense in the context of a 550 recovery action.

That section of the decision begins by noting that to recover from a subsequent transferee, the Trustee must first show that the initial transfers, in our case, the transfers from BLMIS to Sentry are avoidable.

The district court then explained that a subsequent transferee has a right to raise the initial transferee's defenses to avoidance, explaining and I quote from that page 7, even if the initial or immediate transferee fails to raise a Section 546(e) defense against the Trustee's avoidance of certain transfers, either because the Trustee did not bring an adversary proceeding against that transferee or because the transferee settled with the Trustee or simply because the transferee failed to raise the defense, the subsequent transferee is nonetheless entitled to raise a Section 546(e) defense against recovery of those funds.

In support, the district court cites to and quotes from the bankruptcy court's decision in In Re Fabrikanc.

And that establishes that a Trustee need not obtain a fully litigated avoidance order against an initial transferee before bringing a recovery action, but the defendant subsequent transferees can raise that in that recovery action and can defend it on the basis that the initial transfers were not fraudulent.

In other words, in a recovery action against the subsequent transferee, the defendant may challenge the avoidance of the initial transfer by asserting the initial transferee's defenses to avoidance. But then the district court announces that there's one caveat to this rule. And it is this one caveat that demonstrates that part 2 of the district court's bottom line order does not require the Trustee to allege a subsequent transferee's actual knowledge, where the initial transferee itself has actual knowledge.

Quoting now from page 7 of the district court's

Cohmad decision, the district court said, there's one caveat

to this rule, to the extent an innocent customer transferred

funds to a subsequent transferee who had actual knowledge of

Madoff's securities fraud, that subsequent transferee cannot

prevail on a motion to dismiss on the basis of Section

546(e) safe harbor.

The one caveat applies where an innocent customer transferred funds to a subsequent transferee who had actual knowledge. In other words, the one caveat applies only where an innocent, initial transferee, one without actual knowledge, could have asserted a successful 546(e) defense to avoidance. That's the only scenario where the Trustee must plead the subsequent transferee's actual knowledge, where there is an innocent initial transferee.

Thus it's clear that the caveat does not require the Trustee to independently plead the actual knowledge of the subsequent transferee where the initial transferee could itself not assert a valid 546(e) defense.

Returning now to the bottom line holding, which appears on page 1 of the district court's decision. Part one of Cohmad as Mr. Lack explained, stands for the proposition that 546(e) will not bar avoidance where the initial transferee has actual knowledge.

Part 2 of Cohmad reflects the one caveat that we just discussed and that's clear because it applies only where there is an innocent initial transferee, one with actual knowledge -- without actual -- one without actual knowledge, I'm sorry, Your Honor. And 546(e) otherwise applies to bar avoidance of the initial transfer.

Part 2 begins quote, where the Trustee has sought to recover transfers to a subsequent transferee, the avoidance of which would otherwise be barred by Section 546(e) as to the initial transferee.

That makes clear that part 2 only applies where the initial transferee has a valid 546(e) defense to avoidance. And we can stop there, because that isn't the case here, where avoidance of the initial transfer is not barred by 546(e) at the pleading stage, as a result of Your Honor's finding that the Trustee has adequately pled

Sentry's actual knowledge.

If the defendant's theory were correct, and the Trustee is required to plead the actual knowledge of both the initial and subsequent transferees, then there would be no need for the district court's one caveat. Instead, one caveat makes clear that the only situation where a Trustee must plead the subsequent transferee's actual knowledge is when there's an innocent initial transferee.

Part two, the one caveat is intended to prevent a subsequent transferee with actual knowledge from being able to step into the shoes of an innocent initial transferee and assert the initial transferee's 546(e) defense.

And, Your Honor, this interpretation is confirmed by later decisions from the district court and the bankruptcy court applying Cohmad.

Turning first to the district court's consolidated decision regarding the Trustee's right to bring a 550 recovery action without first obtaining an order of avoidance. That decision is reported at 501 B.R. 26 and cited on page 36 of the Trustee's opposition brief.

Multi-Strategy is bound by that decision as it was among the parties who withdrew the reference on that issue. The district court issued the decision several months after its Cohmad decision and held, the Trustee did not have to obtain a fully litigated final judgment of avoidance against

the relevant initial transferee as a precondition to bringing the recovery action against the subsequent transferee.

But and I quote from that decision at 501 B.R. 29, Section 550(a) requires that the Trustee show that the initial transferee he seeks to recover is avoidable in each recovery action. And the subsequent transferee in possession of that transfer may raise any defense to avoidance available to the initial transferee, as well as any defenses to recovery it may have.

The district court set out a few general principles guiding its decision and these two quotes that I'm about to read appear at the bottom of 29 and the top of 30 in that decision.

First, the transfer that the Trustee must prove is avoidable is the initial transfer of property by the debtor, not any subsequent transfers of that property to the defendants from whom the Trustee seeks to recover here.

Second, and relatedly, it is well established the concepts of avoidance and recovery are separate and distinct. As set forth in the Bankruptcy Code, each type of action is subject to different defenses, including separate statutes of limitations.

Applying those principles, Your Honor, to the question of whether a subsequent transferee may raise the

initial transferee statute of limitations' defense that this court held, a subsequent transferee from whom the Trustee seeks to recover, may assert any defense to avoidance available to the initial transferee unless collateral estoppel or res judicata applies. That's at page 35 of that decision.

And a little bit further down on 35 and 36, the district court made clear that the subsequent transferee could raise that defense, but only to the extent that the initial transferee could itself raise the defense.

In other words, the subsequent transferee can step into the initial transferee's shoes to challenge avoidance, but it does so only to the extent that the initial transferee could itself raise the defense. To hold otherwise, the district court instructed, would quote, conflate the separate concepts of avoidance and recovery. Thus, when the initial transferee's barred from asserting the Section 546(e) defense to avoidance, so too is the subsequent transferee stepping into its shoes.

Now, the Bankruptcy Court applied this Cohmad decision in a situation that's analogous to the case before you today and that was in Picard v BNP, 549 B.R. 167. And there, the Bankruptcy Court held, quote, by its terms, the safe harbor is a defense to avoidance of the initial transfer.

And citing to page 7 of the Cohmad decision where the district court discussed how to apply this defense in a recovery action against the subsequent, the BNP court said a subsequent transferee is protected indirectly, to the extent that the initial transfer is not avoidable because of the safe harbor.

The Bankruptcy Court continued, the Trustee does not, however, avoid the subsequent transfer. He recovers the value of the avoided initial transfer from the subsequent transferee under 11 U.S.C. Section 550(a) and the safe harbor does not refer to recovery claims under Section 550.

Now, Multi-Strategy argues in its reply that the BNP decision doesn't apply or is inconsistent with the district court's Cohmad decision. Specifically they argue that the Bankruptcy Court focused on a strawman argument by not considering quote, whether a subsequent transferee's invocation of Section 546(e) is barred by the initial transferee's actual knowledge. That's at page 5 of their reply.

But that's simply wrong. In BNP the subsequent transferee defendants made the same argument the defendant does here. And Your Honor can see that by looking at the reply brief in that action, which is available on the Court's docket at 12 -- Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01576

	Page 47
1	and it's ECF No. 116 and the quotes that I'm about to read
2	appear on pages 9 and 10.
3	There, the defendant argued, quote, the trustee
4	can escape application of the Section 546(e) to his recovery
5	claims here only by sufficiently pleading that both the
6	initial and and the initial transferees and the BNP
7	defendant who is the subsequent transferee there had actual
8	knowledge of the Madoff fraud.
9	THE COURT: Mr. Feil just froze.
10	MR. FEIL: I'm sorry, can you see me?
11	THE COURT: Did everybody else freeze or is it
12	just Mr. Feil?
13	MR. FEIL: I
14	THE COURT: Mr. Cremona?
15	MR. CREMONA: Seems fine to me, Your Honor.
16	MR. FEIL: I can hear you, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: Are you frozen.
18	MR. CREMONA: I am not.
19	THE COURT: Yes.
20	MR. FEIL: Can you not hear any of us? Your
21	Honor, I can hear you.
22	THE COURT: Why Mr. Fourmaux, you're not
23	frozen, are you?
24	MR. FEIL: Your Honor, are you able to hear me?
25	THE COURT: Are you frozen? I'm frozen.

Page 48 1 I can, I can hear you, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: I'm the one. I'm the one that froze. 3 MR. FEIL: Okay. Are you able to hear me now? THE COURT: I am. 5 MR. FEIL: Okay. 6 THE COURT: You were at Docket No. on our -- you 7 were talking about Docket No. 8 MR. FEIL: Yes, that's right. 9 THE COURT: And that was when you froze. 10 Okay. I'll pick up there, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 12 MR. FEIL: You're welcome, thank you. 13 So what I was mentioning was the reply brief, the 14 defendant's reply brief in the BNP action. I'm about to 15 read two quotes from that, that demonstrate that they made 16 the same argument that the defendant here is making now. 17 And their reply brief is available on the docket for Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01576, and that's at ECF No. 116 18 19 and it's two quotes that appear on pages 9 and 10. 20 And they say that the trustee can escape the 21 application of Section 546(e) to his recovery claims here 22 only by sufficiently pleading both that the initial 23 transferees and the BNPP defendant who is the subsequent 24 transferee there, had actual knowledge of the Madoff fraud. 25 That's precisely what they're arguing here, Your

Honor, is that even though we've alleged that the actual knowledge of the initial transferee, we also have to allege the actual knowledge of the subsequent transferee and it continued in the BNP brief to say, Section 546(e) is intended to provide an objective safe harbor to the entire chain of securities customers. And that's exactly what Mr. Lack just argued.

Those are the same arguments that they made in their brief as well. Even where this Court has determined that the Trustee would have to allege the subsequent transferee's actual knowledge, even where this Court has determined that the initial transferee has already been alleged to have actual knowledge.

In other words, Your Honor, like the defendant in BNP, Multi-Strategy is arguing the Trustee must sufficiently plead both of their actual knowledge.

Near the end of the Cohmad decision there's a section where Judge -- the district court considers a hypothetically whether a securities agreement between an initial and subsequent transferee could satisfy the securities contract element of 546(e).

The defendant suggests that this hypothetical gives it an independent right to assert 546(e) in this recovery action. But that's not what Cohmad held. As previously discussed, Cohmad sets forth a single situation

where the subsequent transferee's actual knowledge is relevant and that's where the initial transferee does not have actual knowledge.

This was an issue at the time, the question of whether another agreement could satisfy the securities contract element because the district court's holdings in In Katz and Gripe were on appeal before the Second Circuit.

And the Second Circuit has not yet issued its decision in Ida Fishman confirming that the BLMIS account opening agreement satisfied the securities contract element.

A group of financial institution defendants there argued that even if Madoff's account documents were not securities contracts, various other types of contracts could satisfy that element of 546(e).

The district court's hypothetical was addressing this argument, and while it agreed to other -- that other contracts could satisfy that element, it did not suggest in its hypothetical that the existence of such a contract would shift the actual knowledge analysis to the subsequent transferee.

To the contrary, Your Honor, that decision reiterated that the focus of 546(e) remained on the avoidance of the initial transfer from the debtor to the initial transferee. And in BNP, the bankruptcy court did not even feel the need to address this hypothetical, even

though the subsequent transferee defendants there argued again Section 546(e) is intended to provide an objective safe harbor to the entire chain of securities customers. The bankruptcy court's decision in BNP is law of the case and it is binding on Multi-Strategy.

Accepting defendant's position, Your Honor, would conflate the Code separation between avoidance and recovery. Accepting Multi-Strategy's position would mean that the safe harbor would apply even where the initial transferee knew there were no securities transactions in need need of protection. It would also result in a situation where the avoidability of the initial transfer turned on what the initial transferee subsequently did with the transfer after receiving it.

Take for example a situation where a Trustee prevails in an avoidance action against the initial transferee who had actual knowledge. Having obtained that avoidance judgment, the Trustee then seeks to recover portions of the initial transfer from two different subsequent transferees, one with actual knowledge and one without.

Can the transferee without actual knowledge argue that the avoidance was wrongly decided? And if so, could the Trustee still recover from the other subsequent transferee who had actual knowledge, even though the

transfer is now not avoidable? That doesn't make sense,
Your Honor. You can't have the same transfer avoidable in
one action and not avoidable in another. As the district
court held in 550 -- in its 550 decision, this would
conflate the separate concepts of avoidance and recovery.

And just one last note about the defendant's contention that Your Honor's holding in Fairfield Investment Fund shows that you can apply 546(e) to a subsequent transferee, even where the initial has actual knowledge.

That wouldn't explain why Your Honor dismissed the two year claims against Ms. Piedrahita. And there are two other reasons why the Court would have considered Ms. Piedrahita's actual knowledge and that's because as an agent of Fairfield, her actual knowledge would be imputable to the initial transferee.

And then second, when the Court decided that case, the Citibank -- the Second Circuit has not issued its decision in Citibank yet. Thus, the Trustee was required to plead the subsequent transferee's lack of good faith which required a showing of willful blindness or actual knowledge.

Just one last note on 546(e) and then I'll move on to customer property. And that's that the defendant says that we conceded that their transfer was in connection with -- well, the initial transfer from BLMIS to Sentry was in connection with an agreement between them. As I just

Page 53 1 explained, I don't think that that's relevant, but we did 2 not concede that point and we specifically refuted it at footnote 14 on page 36 of our brief. 3 So with that, I'll move -- unless Your Honor has 4 5 any questions about 546(e), I'll move on to the customer 6 property issue. 7 THE COURT: No, I don't believe so. I think 8 you've explained 546(e) very clearly. 9 MR. FEIL: Thank you. 10 So I'd like to begin by just explaining why the 11 Trustee satisfied its pleading burden under Rule 8 with 12 respect to the subsequent transfer claim and then I'll 13 address the defendant's arguments briefly. 14 First, Sentry -- the alleged -- the Trustee 15 alleges the following. First, Sentry sent substantially all 16 of its assets to BLMIS to be custodied and invested. 17 Second, Multi-Strategy delivered funds to Sentry 18 for the purpose of having them custodied and invested with 19 BLMIS. 20 Third, in February of 2005, Multi-Strategy got so 21 scared about Madoff and the potential Ponzi scheme, that it 22 redeemed all of its Madoff investments, including those made 23 through Sentry. 24 Fourth, Sentry responded to the defendant's 25 redemption request by transferring \$25,763,374 to

defendant's designated New York bank account on March 15th, 2005.

Fifth, when Madoff's fraud was revealed publicly defendant expressed satisfaction and good fortune that it had obtained this transfer while it could before Madoff's Ponzi scheme collapsed.

This record satisfies the Trustee's pleading burden under Rule 8(a) because it gives the defendant notice of the claims against it and plausibly alleges that the defendant received a subsequent transfer that contained stolen customer property.

Defendant advances two arguments as to why the

Trustee has fallen short here, and before I address the

substance of their arguments, it's worth noting that the

overwhelming weight of authority favors allowing the Trustee

to proceed to discovery on this point.

The case law establishes that there's an equitable element to tracing, and that the Court should look to all of the circumstances surrounding the transfers, including the purposes of the transfers and the parties' intent.

Despite dedicating a third of both of their briefs to this argument, the defendant identifies only two cases that even dismissed claims at the pleading stage, both of which allowed the plaintiff to replead.

So then I'll move on to their arguments. The

first argument that Mr. Lack discussed today was that the Trustee has not linked the subsequent transfer to any specific initial transfers. And this argument relies almost entirely on the Picard v Shapiro. But that case is easily distinguishable from the incident case.

The Court there found that the complaint lacked the vital statistics necessary to support the subsequent transfer claim, because it alleged the subsequent transfers upon information and belief and without any detail.

Because the complaint lacked these vital statistics, the Court found, and I quote, this is on page 119, 542 B.R. at 119, because the complaint lacked these vital statistics, the Court found he did not plausibly imply that the initial transferees even made subsequent transfers to the subsequent transferees.

As discussed here, the vital statistics are set forth in the amended complaint. Moreover, defendant has stipulated to the fact that it received the subsequent transfer from Sentry. It has also submitted documents with its motion evidencing that it received the subsequent transfer from Sentry.

Thus, there's no question that Sentry made the subsequent transfer to Multi-Strategy. And the bankruptcy court's statement in the complaint in Shapiro did not tie any initial transfer to a subsequent transfer or subsequent

transferee, was made in the context of allegations lacking these basic vital statistics, and it should not require such linkage here.

That's especially true where the Trustee plausibly alleges that pursuant to Sentry's own governing documents, BLMIS was the custodian of substantially all of Sentry's assets.

At a loss for supporting authority, Your Honor, defendant cites in its reply to cases that denied motions to dismiss, nevertheless claiming that they support dismissal here. And I'll just talk about one briefly and that Judge's Lifland's decision in Cohmad, the original decision which is 454 B.R. 317. The relevant portion is at page 340 and there, Judge Lifland set forth the same Rule 8(a) notice pleading that the Trustee asserts here.

Quote, set forth the necessary vital statistics
the who, when, and how much of the purported transfers. And
Judge Lifland set the baseline for pleading a subsequent
transfer, as quote, at the very least, the Trustee must
plead a statement of facts that adequately appraises the
subsequent transferees of the transfers he seeks to recover.

And although Judge Lifland discussed connections between the initial and subsequent transfers there, he concluded, quote, if the information contained in the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto provide more

than enough detail to provide the defendants with notice of when and what amount, with what frequency and from whom they received subsequent transfers, as well as why. And again, here, as I mentioned, there's no doubt that the amended complaint alleges all those same things.

Defendant next argues that the Trustee -- the

Trustee's allegations in this and other actions render it

impossible that the Trustee -- that the subsequent transfer

received from Sentry contained any stolen customer property.

To support this theory, the defendant adopts an allegation made by the Fairfield liquidators, that says, from time to time to make redemption payments, Sentry made withdrawals from Sentry's BLMIS accounts or utilized subscription monies of other investors on hand that were directed from investment in BLMIS.

In other words, defendant is suggesting that the subsequent transfer it received could not have contained any stolen customer property but was instead, comprised solely of funds from Sentry's other investors directed from investment with BLMIS.

It's essentially asking this Court to discredit the Trustee's well pled allegation that Sentry's governing documents provided that it sent substantially all of its assets to BLMIS, based on this allegation of the Fairfield liquidators.

Defendant's argument fails at the pleading stage for four reasons. First, even if the liquidator's allegation is true, it doesn't establish how Sentry accomplished this. Was it from a commingled account, were certain redemptions paid entirely from one source or another, or were they all paid from a combination of funds? This all underscores that the key category of data is missing from the analysis, and that's the dates and amounts of influence of funds to Sentry and what Sentry did with those funds. Without that part of the picture, it's impossible to accurately assess to what extent each subsequent transfer contained customer property. And in this situation, the case law is clear, that the Trustee is not required to trace customer property at the pleading stage or even at summary judgment. This is why the defendant is unable to point the Court to a single case, dismissing subsequent transfer claims at the pleading stage under a similar theory. Defendant nevertheless is asking this Court to reach a finding of fact at the pleading stage that the transfer it received contained no stolen customer property. It does not disclose what tracing methodology it purports to use to reach this conclusion. In its reply,

defendant asserts that no tracing is required, only simple

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arithmetic. But defendant's simple arithmetic appears to be premised on a first in first out tracing methodology, which again is not appropriate at the pleading stage. This is a question for this Court to decide upon a full record, including fact and expert discovery.

Second, the liquidator's allegation suggests that

Sentry treated redemption and subscription funds as fungible

and commingled those funds. But this type of commingling

does not defeat the Trustee's ability to trace customer

property, nor does it require the Trustee to do so at the

pleading stage.

Third, defendant's argument is premised entirely on the assumption that the Trustee's subsequent transfer exhibits can be read to establish that every subsequent transfer was comprised solely of stolen BLMIS customer property. But those exhibits do not establish that fact.

At the pleading stage, the Trustee is not required to plead, much less establish than an alleged subsequent transfer is comprised solely of customer property. As Judge Lifland explained in Charles Ellerin Trust, even at summary judgment, it's not necessary for the Trustee to specify what portion of the subsequent transfer was derived from BLMIS.

Because the Trustee's transfer exhibits do not establish that each transfer was comprised solely of BLMIS customer property, defendant's arithmetic tracing method

breaks down and there's nothing to support their contention that Sentry had exhausted the customer property on hand.

And defendant makes no attempt in its reply brief to address this fatal flaw in its argument.

Moreover, for this Court to discredit defendant's or credit defendant's argument and find that at the pleading stage that the Trustee's transfer exhibits establish that each transfer was comprised entirely of stolen customer property it would have implications for other defendants, who are also claiming that the transfers they received contained no customer property.

Your Honor may have noticed from the motions that have been coming in, that this is a theme. Every party is arguing that somebody else got the customer property, which just underscores why this issue is not appropriate on a motion to dismiss.

Which brings me to the fourth reason. It's simply premature to make these determinations at the pleading stage. Courts in this district and even in this liquidation have denied summary judgment where even a small or undetermined portion of customer property was conceivably traceable to the debtor.

The decision -- the bankruptcy court's decision in

In Re Dreier is instructive and there, the bankruptcy court

allowed the Trustee to proceed to trial where at most, 3 and

a half percent of the transfers at issue could be traced to the debtor's Ponzi scheme.

And I'll just quote really quickly from that case on page 15, it's 2014 Westlaw 47774 at 15. The subsequent transferees argue that the Trustee failed to show that the funds actually paid them any fees. However, it's reasonable to assume that the funds satisfied their obligation to pay fees under the solo note investments. And the Trustee is not required to perform dollar-for-dollar tracing at the summary judgment stage.

Finally, the manager's speculation that tracing is not likely to reveal a subsequent transfer of stolen note proceeds hardly justifies granting the cross motion for summary judgment.

Similarly here, Your Honor, it's reasonable to assume that Sentry satisfied its obligations under its own private placement memoranda to custody substantially all of its assets with BLMIS especially at the pleading stage.

Moreover, like the defendant in Charles Ellerin

Trust, defendant here quote, mistakenly argues that the

trustee must include evidence proving that the only funding

source for the initial transferee was from a Madoff account.

One note on the defendant's argument about the Trustee having access to documents, as an initial matter, the Trustee does not have a complete set of Fairfield's

Page 62 1 In fact, some of the documents defendant books and records. 2 submitted with its own motion were new to us. 3 Moreover, nothing using Rule 8(a) suggests that a 4 plaintiff should be required to offer proof at the pleading 5 stage if it has access to documents. To the contrary, the 6 cases on this issue do not demand that level of proof even 7 following discovery. 8 And I'll rest with that unless Your Honor has any 9 questions. 10 THE COURT: I don't. I'll have questions for Mr. 11 Lack about it, but not you. 12 MR. FEIL: Okay. I'll turn it over to my 13 colleague, Mr. Friedman then to address personal 14 jurisdiction. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Friedman. 16 MR. FRIEDMAN: Good morning, Your Honor. My name 17 is Matthew Friedman and I'm an associate at Baker Hostetler. 18 On behalf of the Trustee I'd like to briefly respond to 19 Multi-Strategy Funds and Mr. Fourmaux's arguments on 20 personal jurisdiction. 21 Your Honor, Multi-Strategy Fund has argued that 22 each contact on its own is not enough for purposeful 23 availment. But within this liquidation, the Court in Picard 24 Bureau of Labor Insurance or BLI, found that several 25 contacts also present here, together establish purposeful

availment on the basis of an intention to invest with BLMIS and U.S. listed securities.

Judge Lifland's decision in BLI is good law and by itself, establishes personal jurisdiction in this case.

That said here, they're even stronger and additional contacts than there were in BLI in the totality of the circumstances.

Multi-Strategy Fund first subscribed in BLMIS feeder funds in 1999, but for expanding their BLMIS investment with a Sentry subscription in late June 2004. Fairfield Greenwich Group or FGG who operated and controlled Sentry labeled Multi-Strategy Fund a Madoff addict who needed a fix.

And like in BLI, the contacts here underscore

Multi-Strategy Fund's intention to invest even more with

BLMIS. A couple of weeks after that first subscription

Mario Therrien, the president of Multi-Strategy Fund came to

New York in mid-July to meet with FGG regarding Multi
Strategy Fund's Sentry investment. This is a key contact.

Multi-Strategy Fund is coming into the jurisdiction to learn more about their Sentry investment.

In Walden as you heard Mr. Fourmaux today it's one of Multi-Strategy Fund's main cases, that decision says that physical presence isn't a prerequisite to jurisdiction, but it's certainly a relevant contact.

That meeting also preceded Multi-Strategy Fund's second subscription and their redemption and receipt of the stolen customer property that the Trustee seeks to recover in this action.

Following the July 2004 meeting, Multi-Strategy

Fund sent numerous e-mails to FGG that underscored their

emphasis on the amount. They asked for info that you've got

on Madoff, they asked how Madoff made money, and they asked

when Madoff was invested in a given month.

For his part, Mr. Therrien sent at least seven inquiries regarding additional Sentry capacity and that led to a second subscription ultimately in January 2005.

I want to briefly touch on the two subscription agreements that you can see attached to Mr. Therrien's declaration at Exhibits A and B. They're significant for several reasons.

First, they both contain New York jurisdiction, forum selection and choice of law provisions. Second, by executing the subscription agreements, Multi-Strategy Fund agreed to deliver subscription money to an HSBC account in New York and they did so.

But third, and most importantly, Multi-Strategy

Fund attached a one page document on Multi-Strategy Fund

letterhead that designated a Bank of New York account in New

York. You can see this one page document at page 13 of both

Exhibits A and B to Mr. Therrien's declaration.

That Bank of New York account was used first for sending subscription money to Sentry, but on top of that, Multi-Strategy Fund directed FGG to use that Bank of New York account for any Sentry redemption.

They also directed FGG to do that in their redemption request, as you can see at Exhibit C to Mr.

Therrien's declaration and page 6 is that same one page document. Ultimately, Multi-Strategy Fund used that Bank of New York account for every Sentry transaction they engaged in.

Keeping up the theme of the focus on Madoff, when Multi-Strategy Fund redeemed in February 2005 it was because as my colleague Mr. Feil has accounted, Mr. Therrien was, quote, so scared of Madoff and the potential Ponzi scheme.

Now, when Mr. Therrien informed FTG that MultiStrategy Fund was redeeming from Sentry, he and the FGG
partner he spoke to, discussed the rumors about Madoff.
Your Honor, these contacts belie Multi-Strategy Fund's
argument that the Trustee is depending on imputing contacts
from Sentry, BLMIS or a bank. The Trustee has not alleged
or argued for alter ego or imputation from those entities.

As the Supreme Court said in Walden a defendant's contacts with the forum state may be intertwined with those transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other

parties. All the contacts alleged in the amended complaint are Multi-Strategy Fund's contacts, even if they're intertwined with Sentry or BLMIS or a New York bank.

As in BLI, Multi-Strategy Fund invested in Sentry with a specific purpose of having fund investments with BLMIS in New York and in U.S. listed investments.

Multi-Strategy Fund was another Madoff addict that subscribed to the additional access to Madoff. They asked questions about Madoff and they redeemed because they were so scared of Madoff and the potential Ponzi scheme. They visited New York and used New York bank accounts to subscribe and redeem.

Speaking of the New York bank accounts, I want to respond to two new cases that Multi-Strategy Fund cites in its reply, an argument that they make about correspondent bank accounts.

Multi-Strategy Funds says they're not a bank and the HSBC and Bank of New York accounts are not their accounts. So in their view, the uses of these accounts don't matter. But they're wrong.

Licci, Al Rushaid and other cases that analyze the correspondent bank account issue don't focus on whether the defendant is a bank, and they don't focus on who the account belongs to. Rather, the key is whether the use of the account was purposeful and volitional rather than passive.

One of the new cases that Multi-Strategy Fund cites in its reply brief, Universal Trading v Tymoshenko confirms that the purposeful aspect is key. In that case, the Court dismissed because the only relevant contact was use of a New York bank account, but there were no allegations that the use was purposeful.

Here, Multi-Strategy Fund directed FGG to deliver redemption payments to the bank of New York account in New York. This is purposeful and volitional. To the extent Multi-Strategy Fund claims that its identity as a non-bank and its use of a third party bank account is dispositive, we've cited several cases finding personal jurisdiction over non-bank defendants that used third party bank accounts for relevant transactions in New York.

For example, in SO Exploration versus Nigerian

National Petroleum, the non-bank defendant argued that it

didn't own the U.S. accounts that were used for the relevant

transactions. But the Court did not find that argument

persuasive, writing and I quote, the point is not whether

the defendant owns the account, it is that they made

purposeful use of them for reasons related to the underlying

dispute. That's 397 F. Supp. 3rd 323 at 346. That standard

is met here.

The correspondent bank account allegations are just one of the places where Multi-Strategy Fund says, this

one contact alone isn't enough to constitute purposeful availment. But that's not the test and that's not our argument.

The defendant in BLI also argued that isolated bank account uses standing alone were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. But Judge Lifland rejected that argument, because personal jurisdiction there was not rooted in the mere existence or maintenance of those accounts. The contacts here support finding personal jurisdiction.

The Berdeaux v OneCoin case, which is also cited in Multi-Strategy Fund's reply for the first time and I believe Mr. Fourmaux quoted it today, that also confirms that the test is the totality of the circumstances. That quote that Mr. Fourmaux read and that they block quote in their reply, that part's dicta, because the Court had already held by that part of the decision that the totality of the circumstances fell short of purposeful availment.

That holding makes sense because in that case, there were far weaker contacts and distinguishable facts. The only relevant contacts for the individual defendant in that case were that the defendant was a New York admitted lawyer, he was convicted of a crime in New York, and he merely knew of a single wire transfer through a New York bank account.

In Berdeaux, Judge Caproni wrote that there cannot be a purposeful use of a bank account unless the defendant, quote, played a role in routing the wire transfers to the New York corresponding account. That's 2021 Westlaw, 4267693 at page 12 footnote 22.

Here, Multi-Strategy Fund played a major role.

They directed Sentry to use the Bank of New York account.

That's more than just moving money as Mr. Fourmaux labeled it this morning.

Berdeaux is also notable because there's nothing in that case that tie the use of the bank account to the claims against the defendant. Here, by contrast, Multi-Strategy Fund received a precise transfer that the Trustee seeks to recover in that Bank of New York account.

Finally, in Berdeaux, the defendant didn't target

New York, or expect to be sued in New York. But here,

Multi-Strategy Fund specifically targeted Madoff in New York

and they signed subscription agreements with a New York

choice of law, forum selection, and jurisdiction provision.

Taking a step back, Your Honor, the contacts that the Trustee has alleged surpass those relied on by Judge Lifland on personal jurisdiction in BLI. Mr. Fourmaux said this morning that BLI didn't address the issues Multi-Strategy Fund raises. But personal jurisdiction was squarely addressed, including some of the same cases that

are cited in the briefing here, and the Court consider analogous facts.

Judge Lifland found personal jurisdiction over a foreign entity that invested tens of millions of dollars in Sentry with a specific goal of having funds invested with BLMIS in New York. And with the intention of profiting from that U.S. based investment.

The defendant in BLI knew, intended, and contemplated that its Sentry investment would be transferred to BLMIS in New York, to be invested in the New York securities market.

Now, we spent pages in our opposition brief discussing BLI in more detail and why it applies, so I won't belabor the point here. But as in BLI, the Court should find personal jurisdiction over Multi-Strategy Fund.

Multi-Strategy Fund has argued that BLI was overruled, but they're wrong. Given that the Trustee is not relying on imputation or alter ego, the only case they cite that potentially overrules BLI is Walden. But Walden's inapposite here. It's an intentional tort case that was applying an effects test. Purposeful availment was not at issue, and in fact, is never even mentioned in the decision.

In Walden, the Supreme Court found that there was no personal jurisdiction over a police officer who merely knew that the plaintiff was from Nevada. But he had no

other jurisdictionally relevant contacts there. By contrast, Multi-Strategy Fund intentionally directed funds to BLMIS through Sentry, which was a fund that they knew was going to funnel investments to BLMIS.

They try to paint a picture as if they were simply purchasing shares in a foreign fund and that foreign fund was the one that invested their money with New York based BLMIS. This is misdirection. It's actually the same argument that BLI made, because -- it's the same argument that BLI made, but Judge Lifland called it disingenuous, because it isn't happenstance or a coincidence that BLI's money or Multi-Strategy Fund's money ended up at BLMIS. It was always their intention that it would.

The last argument I want to address is this idea that Multi-Strategy Funds' New York contacts aren't related to the Trustee's claim. In support, Multi-Strategy Funds relies on a series of contract cases, where there is no connection between the claim and the contract. That's simply not this case.

The Trustee's claim arises from federal law, not a contract, and he seeks to recover a subsequent transfer of stolen customer property to Multi-Strategy Fund.

As an example of this argument, they cite two cases that were also cited by the BNP Paribas defendants in their motion to dismiss. Those two cases are Hill versus

HSBC and Hau Yin To versus HSBC.

In BNP Paribas, the bankruptcy court found that those two cases had no bearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction arising from the defendant's redemption as investors in Tremont feeder funds that arose from the defendant's New York contacts.

This was because a lack of personal jurisdiction in Hill and Hau Yin To was based on merely incidental contacts. Those contacts related to fulfilling a foreign contract to provide custodial and administrative services for feeder funds.

Here, this case does not involve a contract to supply goods or services and there is no claim for breach of contract or a common law. Each of the New York contacts alleged in the amended complaint directly relates to the Trustee's claim against Multi-Strategy Fund.

In Ford Motor Company, the Supreme Court made clear, that a causal relationship between the claim and the contacts is not required. Instead, there need only be a relatedness between the transaction and the legal claim, such that the latter is not completely (indiscernible) from the former. That's a quote from Licci 2, 732 F3d 161 at 168 to 169.

Multi-Strategy Fund's New York contacts underscore their purpose and intent to invest with BLMIS in New York.

Page 73 These contacts directly relate to Multi-Strategy Fund's redemption and their receipt of more than \$25 million of stolen customer property. They therefore relate to the Trustee's claim to recover that money for the benefit of the estate. Unless Your Honor has any questions, I'll turn it over for rebuttal unless Mr. Feil has something to add. MR. FEIL: Your Honor, I just wanted to address your question about Kingate. You're right, we do cite the Kingate at the beginning of our complaint and that's just --THE COURT: (indiscernible) MR. FEIL: I'm sorry, that's just to note that the defendant also received transfers from Kingate, that the Trustee had dropped those claims because he reached a full recovery in the settlement with Kingate. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. FEIL: You're welcome. THE COURT: Okay. I have a couple of questions, Mr. Lack, this is your question. MR. LACK: Yes. THE COURT: In Case 109 -- excuse me 09-01239 in the Corina Piedrahita case, knowledge was relevant because that was an initial transfer. And for -- in Fairfield and good faith prior to the Second Circuit's agenda, it's not relevant for the subsequent transfer, and for the safe

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Page 74 1 harbor defense. I want you to talk to me about that, 2 because that's my opinion. 3 MR. LACK: Right, exactly, Your Honor. And it is 4 true --5 THE COURT: Initial as subsequent, talk to me. 6 MR. LACK: Yes, absolutely. 7 It is certainly true, Your Honor, that you looked at the knowledge of Ms. Piedrahita and other officers and 8 agents of Fairfield Funds --9 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. LACK: -- in order to determine whether their 12 knowledge could be imputed to Fairfield as an initial 13 transferee. And you found that in fact, not with respect to 14 Ms. Piedrahita, but with respect to all the other 15 individuals who were officers and agents. You found that 16 they did have, they were adequately alleged to have known 17 that Madoff was not trading securities. Their knowledge 18 could be imputed to the Fairfield Funds, therefore, 19 Fairfield Funds had actual knowledge and they could not 20 invoke the safe harbor as initial transferee. 21 But if the Trustee's theory had been correct, you 22 would have stopped there and say, well now that I've found that the initial transferee Fairfield Sentry and other 23 24 Fairfield Funds cannot invoke the safe harbor, that disposes 25 of all the subsequent transfer claims because they can't

invoke the safe harbor either.

But you didn't do that, you dismissed the subsequent transfer claims against Ms. Piedrahita. And the only basis we submit you could have done that on was Section 546(e). And the reason we say that is because with respect to the good faith defense, it was also asserted by the subsequent transferees, you held that because the defendants had the burden of proving value as an element of the good faith defense, that you could not address the good faith defense on a motion to dismiss.

And therefore, the only basis we submit this Court could have had to dismiss the claim, subsequent transfer claim that Ms. Piedrahita is 546(e).

Now, Mr. Feil noted that there were some transfers, subsequent transfers to Ms. Piedrahita within two years of the petition date. And he asked well how could they have been under 546(e).

There may be a question as to those transfers,

Your Honor, but there were other transfers that were beyond

the two year period. And as to those, we submit, the only

basis on which this Court could have dismissed the

subsequent transfers against Ms. Piedrahita was 546(e). And

therefore, to be consistent with Your Honor's decision in

Fairfield Investment Fund, which we think was correct

because Ms. Piedrahita did not have actual knowledge

Page 76 1 alleged. She should not have been deprived of the safe 2 harbor. To be consistent with Your Honor's decision in Fairfield Investment Fund, to be consistent with Cohmad, you 3 should dismiss the claim against Fairfield -- against Multi-4 5 Strategy Fund. 6 THE COURT: I think you're misreading it. 7 not correct. I dismissed on good faith. So okay. 8 MR. LACK: Well --9 THE COURT: Anything else you wish to rebut? I've 10 heard you. Anything else you wish --11 MR. LACK: Okay. Let me go back and -- because --12 let me go back to the basic argument that Mr. Feil made. He 13 says basically that Multi-Strategy as a subsequent 14 transferee, under Cohmad steps into the shoes of the initial 15 transferee. That is not correct. Okay. It's not correct 16 as a statutory basis, it's not correct under Cohmad. 17 Section 546(e) and Section 550(a) refer to 18 avoidability of the transfer, not the liability of the 19 transferee. 550(a) does not say if the initial transferee 20 is liable, then the subsequent transferee is also liable. 21 And the finding -- determining factor in Cohmad 22 was the actual knowledge of the transferee who was being 23 sought to be recovered against as the defendant. Now, Judge Rakoff clearly did not hold that the 24 25 ability of the subsequent transferee to invoke the safe

harbor depends on the initial transferee. Paragraph 2 of his ruling says just the opposite. Even if the initial transferee is innocent, that doesn't mean the subsequent transferee necessarily didn't invoke the safe harbor. The determinate is the actual knowledge of the particular transferee being sued.

And I'd like to note that Section 546(e) reflects
Congress' determination to protect the legitimate
expectations of people engaging in securities transactions.
The Second Circuit has been very clear about that. The
Second Circuit's been clear that it holds the safe harbor,
even in situations where someone might have said, well, they
should have an exception, you should have an exception, the
Trustee argued in the Madoff case, because it was a Ponzi
scheme, and because Madoff wasn't actually trading
securities. The Second Circuit said no, we're enforcing
Section 546(e) as written as Congress intended.

And so here, Judge Rakoff looked at exactly those legitimate expectations and drawing the line in Cohmad. He said that where the transferee knows, actually knows that there are no securities contracts because Madoff is not trading securities, then they can't invoke the safe harbor, because they have no legitimate expectations.

But that rationale applies where the subsequent transferee did have a legitimate expectation as Multi-

Strategy did. And a legitimate expectation that Madoff had to secure these contract with Sentry and it had a -- Multi-Strategy had a securities contract with Sentry itself. And therefore, there is no -- it would be flouting Congress' intent under Section 546(e) to deprive the subsequent transferee, in that situation, of the use of the safe harbor. And it's a safe harbor again as to the initial transfer.

We're not saying, and this is the strawman argument that Mr. Feil repeats here, we're not saying that the Section 546(e) applies directly to subsequent transfers. It protects the initial transfer. It protects the initial transfer because he admits and does not dispute, for example, that Sentry was a financial institution. Doesn't dispute that Madoff was a stockholder. He doesn't dispute there were securities contracts and settlement payments here.

All he basically says is that the knowledge of the initial transferee can be a transfer over to the subsequent transferee and thereby, depriving the safe harbor of someone who had a legitimate expectation based on the fact that someone else didn't have a legitimate expectation. And we don't think that is consistent with Congress' intent.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LACK: Let me say one other thing about -- in

response on the customer property side, because Mr. Feil repeated a misrepresentation he made in his opening brief that we had responded to in footnote 3 of our -- I'm sorry, a misrepresentation in his amended complaint, which we responded to in footnote 3 of our opening brief.

He said that we stipulated that customer property was received. That is not true at all. I have the stipulation here which he's referring to. It's ECF 88 and the language that we said was, the remaining Count II of the complaint as to CDP is dismissed, without prejudice, based on defendant's representation that Multi-Strategy and not CDP received the transfer from Fairfield Sentry Limited. It says nothing about customer property.

So it is incorrect to suggest that we have in any case -- any instance stipulated or admitted that we received customer property. The evidence -- and we're not talking about the evidence that we came up with, the evidence proffered in the complaint and its exhibits in our case, in the Fairfield, the second amended complaint which is incorporated by reference into our case, complaint. In the other complaints, all of these pleadings say, allege that the transfer, subsequent transfers made from Sentry were all Madoff customer property.

On a motion to dismiss, it is 100 percent appropriate to hold the plaintiff to what they plead in

their complaint. And if the complaint and its exhibits plead them out of a claim because it renders on its face the claim implausible, then the motion to dismiss must be granted under Iqbal and Twombly. That's exactly what has happened here.

And I can say that there -- the defendant -- the Trustee has had four opportunities to show this Court how it could be that the \$25.8 million that Multi-Strategy received was linked to customer property. Because he didn't do it in the initial complaint, after we pointed out the implausibility of it through the arithmetic exercise of my initial declaration in the initial motion, they filed an amended complaint, they didn't do the linkage in the amended complaint.

After we pointed it out again in our renewed motion to dismiss, they did not do it in their opposing brief and they did not do it in oral argument today. They claim they don't have to do it.

Well, in our case, I think it's clear from what they've actually alleged and in Multi-Strategy's case we can make this case within the four corners of the complaint and the documents of the complaint incorporates by reference.

It is simply implausible that the Madoff -- any Madoff money went to Multi-Strategy. It was all borne based on what the Trustee himself has alleged, and we can hold him to that,

Page 81 1 and Your Honor should hold him to that. 2 And that is -- it's not our obligation to explain 3 where the money would have come from, otherwise, although we 4 do have a good explanation based on what Fairfield Sentry 5 said elsewhere, but it is his, the Trustee's obligation to 6 make a plausible case. He has simply not done it with 7 respect to Multi-Strategy, and therefore, the motion should 8 be --9 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Fourmaux, I have a question 10 for you. 11 MR. FOURMAUX: Yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Did Multi-Strategy sign -- oh, wait a 13 minute, one thing I think this is for both of you. Did 14 Multi-Strategy sign off on the case that was consolidated 15 before Judge Rakoff? 16 MR. LACK: Cohmad, Your Honor? 17 THE COURT: Yes. Yes. 18 MR. LACK: Yes. Multi-Strategy was one of the 19 parties that sought to withdraw the reference in Cohmad --20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. LACK: -- and therefore we believe Cohmad is 22 applicable to our case. 23 THE COURT: I hear you. I just wanted to know the 24 answer to that question and it was a yes or no question. 25 Thank you.

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	Page 82
1	Now then, Mr. Fourmaux, I have a question for you.
2	MR. FOURMAUX: Sure.
3	THE COURT: And it is the Supreme Court decision
4	in Walden. And in the Supreme Court decision to Walden,
5	which I'll quote it, you argue it pretty forcefully, but I
6	want to quote from that case and I want you to answer this.
7	MR. FOURMAUX: Uh-huh.
8	THE COURT: Although physical presence in the
9	forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, physical entry
10	into the state, either by the defendant in person or through
11	an agent, goods, mail or some other means is certainly
12	relevant, please address that.
13	MR. FOURMAUX: Sure, Your Honor. There is only
14	one physical entry alleged in this case and that is
15	THE COURT: Well, let's talk about all the other
16	stuff.
17	MR. FOURMAUX: Okay. Your Honor okay. You
18	were going to physical presence so if I
19	THE COURT: I didn't
20	MR. FOURMAUX: I'll just start with the
21	THE COURT: (indiscernible)
22	MR. FOURMAUX: physical entrance.
23	THE COURT: You just wanted to hear physical
24	presence.
25	MR. FOURMAUX: Okay.

Page 83 1 THE COURT: You didn't hear about all the other 2 mail, such as e-mail, and other means. Talk to me. 3 MR. FOURMAUX: Sure, okay. First, the meeting in 4 New York after the subscription agreement is already signed, 5 after we're already a shareholder. 6 Not every -- yes, physical presence can be relevant sometimes, but not every physical presence, not 7 every meeting is a jurisdictional contact. 8 9 So for instance, in the McKee case from the New 10 York Court of Appeals that we cite, that involved a meeting 11 in New York where the parties discussed the contract that 12 was in dispute. That one meeting, the New York Court of 13 Appeals held that does not constitute a transacting of 14 business. 15 The Court went so far as to say that it wasn't 16 just a minimal, it wasn't even a minimal contact, it was an 17 infinitesimal contact. It was not enough to constitute 18 transacting business in New York. 19 The cases are very clear that isolated meetings, 20 if there's no transaction conducted, there's no negotiation 21 of a further transaction and there's no allegation of that 22 here, than the mere presence in New York is not sufficient. 23 As far as the e-mails and phone calls, though, 24 these are also e-mails and phone calls after the Multi-25 Strategy is already a shareholder in Sentry and there's two

lines of authority that are absolutely applicable here that settle discretion dispositively.

First, there's the Hill and Halian Taul cases which were mentioned just a little bit ago and those are cases where if you have a foreign defendant and a contract that is negotiated and executed outside of the United States, then if there are communications from the foreign location into New York and also payments to and from New York, if it's all incidental to the fulfilling that contract that was negotiated and executed outside of the United States, then it does not support jurisdiction.

Now, they said well, oh, but BNP Paribas already dealt with that and ruled that that is not -- that that line of cases is not non-applicable to any investor in the feeder funds. Absolutely incorrect, Your Honor.

BNP was decided on its facts. In BNP there were foreign defendants; however, they had an office right here in New York, 787 7th Avenue. And the subscription agreements in that case were signed in New York by personnel of the defendant in New York.

So you had an agreement that was executed in New York, beyond -- so the predicate for -- the necessary predicate for the Halian Taul and Hill cases was missing in that case because it was negated by the facts. More than that, the same defendants, employees in New York, also

advantaged the investment, so that the entire situation in BNP was people at 787 7th Avenue dealing with people in Westchester County. That's why those cases didn't apply.

Here, the Trustee concedes that the contracts were negotiated and executed outside of the United States.

That's one line of authority. There's another line of authority that's even longer, that goes back to 1970 from the New York Court of Appeals, and that's the Parke-Bernet case that's been consistently applied for 50 plus years.

And that's if you are outside of New York and you're making a phone call or some other telecommunication into New York, that unless you are transacting business on that call, it doesn't count as a jurisdictional contact.

So that the classic case was, in part, Bernet was there was an auction, an art auction taking place in New York. And in the auction room they turn on the speakerphone and a defendant in California places bids over the speakerphone. And the Court -- then after he doesn't pay for his winning bids and he gets sued in New York.

The Court says, well, okay, you weren't in New York, but you projected yourself into commerce in New York over the telephone. Following that case it's -- there's just dozens and scores of cases, and we cited cases that collect them, that say, you know, if you have a phone call, you have an e-mail, but there's no business -- there's no

transaction conducted or negotiation, then that -- those incidental communications do not qualify as a contact.

And so I -- and I think this is your -- a case,

Your Honor, of lots of zeroes don't add up to something more
than zero. I know they want you to look at the cumulative
impact, but I think that you have here a series of contacts
that count for nothing.

Now, if I may just quickly on the BLI case again, what we really have here is presented as a strawman. They want to pretend that all we're doing is saying the same thing, that the defendant said in BLI. So I just want to make absolutely clear, Your Honor, absolutely clear. We are not saying that it was just a coincidence the money -- or that we were surprised that the money ended up with Madoff.

We're not disputing that the defendant knew and intended for the purposes of this motion, we're not disputing that the defendant knew and intended that its money would eventually go through Sentry into Madoff.

The argument that we we're presenting is that that is not legally sufficient to constitute contact because it's not legally sufficient under very well established case law to impute Sentry's act of investing with Madoff to us, even if we knew about it and even if we intended it.

So they say, we admit that it's not an alter ego, we admit that it's not an agent. Agency would require not

just knowledge and intent and to benefit for the shareholder but also control. And they have not alleged that, and I think they just admitted that they aren't alleging all of those elements.

So without that, the fact that you invested, even knowingly and intendingly through another corporation doesn't make us jurisdictionally present in New York.

Now, Mr. Friedman also talked about bank accounts and just very quickly, he points to a subscription agreement and he says, well, look, let's look at the wire transfer instructions.

So in the subscription agreement Sentry gave its wire transfer instructions for payments that would go into Sentry and Multi-Strategy gave its wire instructions for payments that would go to Multi-Strategy.

And in the wire instructions for Sentry, they list that HSBC USA bank account in the name of Citi -- Citco Bank Netherland N.V. Dublin branch. And then it specifically says for further credit to account name Fairfield Sentry and against an account number.

So the HSBC USA pay account in New York is just for routing to the ultimate destination to Fairfield Sentry in the Dublin, Ireland branch of Citco. There's no claim that Sentry itself has the HSBC account. All they're doing is informing persons that if you're going to send a wire

transfer to us in Ireland, our bank Citco works through

HSBC. Same thing for the Multi-Strategy fund wire transfer

instructions.

It says very clearly, this is in Therrien Exhibits

A and -- A and B, there's wiring instructions, pay through,
those are the words, Your Honor, pay through bank, Bank of

New York and gives an account number. Then says for further
credit to beneficiary's bank, Caisse Centrale Desjardin,
beneficiary's name, Multi-Strategy Fund and it gives the
account number.

So there is -- the money is only passing through the accounts that are maintained not by Sentry and not by Multi-Strategy, but by their perspective banks.

Now, Mr. Friedman talked about a volitional act,
well -- he says, well, you went ahead and put that
information down there in the subscription agreement that's
a volitional act. It's not a volitional you're Your Honor.
We did not choose that our bank would have that particular
corresponding account. It's not a volitional act here, Your
Honor, it's an informational act.

All we do is informing for the convenience of our counterparty here is the bank that our -- here's the correspondent bank that our bank uses. But the transfer itself is from Ireland to Canada and from Canada to Ireland. And the case law that's rehearsed again in the Berdeaux

decision, Judge Caproni makes a survey of the law and concludes that there's no support for the idea that if you're just a customer and the -- you're making a transfer from one foreign location to another foreign location and your banks that you use route through New York on the way, that's not purposefully availing yourself of the privilege of doing business in New York.

And just to be very clear, they said -- Mr.

Friedman said well, you received the redemption payment in the HSBC account. No, Your Honor, absolutely not. HSBC account, or my apologies, the Bank of New York account.

Says well, you received the redemption payment in the Bank of New York account. No.

The Bank of New York account again as it's clearly stated is an account held by Desjardin Bank. When money went into Desjardin's bank account at Bank of New York, Multi-Strategy didn't receive that. The only person who had that money at that point was Desjardin Bank. It is not until Desjardin Bank then credits Multi-Strategy's account, at Multi-Strategy's account at Desjardin in Montreal. That's when Multi-Strategy Fund receives the redemption payment.

The -- Multi-Strategy Fund had no right to withdraw money from correspondent account owned by Desjardin Bank. Now, he says, oh, but we cited cases that shows that

you don't have to own the account. Absolutely false, Your Honor.

So he mentioned the SO versus Nigerian case, the Nigerian Oil case, very important. That case, the facts there were there's a breach of contract action against the Nigerian state oil company which was found to be an alter ego of the Republic of Nigeria. And the situation there was it's the Nigerian state oil company.

The Central Bank of Nigeria opens three accounts at JPMorgan in New York for the benefit of the Nigerian state oil company for the purpose of the Nigerian state oil company to use.

The opinion cites that the Nigerian state oil company received bank statements for those accounts and that it had the authority on its own to transfer money out of those accounts.

So it was a case where the accounts were nominally held in the name of the Central Bank of Nigeria, but they were controlled by the Nigerian state oil company. And it was in that context where the Nigerian state oil company in fact controlled the accounts, that -- the Court said, well, it doesn't matter whose -- you don't get out of this by saying your name isn't on the account. That's completely different, Your Honor, in the situation with Multi-Strategy Fund.

Multi-Strategy Fund doesn't have any control of a Desjardin's account with Bank of New York. That's the same account that any customer of Desjardin Bank, any customer at Desjardin Bank that makes a U.S. dollar wire transfer is going to have their money cashed to that account. But none of the customers control that account.

So all we're doing in the subscription agreement is informing a counterparty of that fact. If we had not listed the correspondent accounts, the exact same thing would have happened. If we had just given our -- if we had just our bank account number at Desjardin Bank and gave that as the wire transfer instructions, the same thing would have happened.

All that would have happened in that case is someone at Citco Bank would have to look up on the Swiss system, who's the correspondent account for Desjardin. And the same transaction would have happened. We had no control over it. All we're doing is essentially saving somebody at a bank a few minutes of looking up a -- the correspondent account number.

So last, if I may, the -- on relatedness. Again - so for a number of these contacts it's obviously -- it's
not enough that there be -- remember there are two parts to
specific jurisdiction. There has to be a contact that
constitutes purposeful availment and the claim must arise

Page 92 1 out of or relate to those contacts. 2 Here, there's no showing or allegation of well how did the fact that money going from Ireland to Canada, how 3 did the fact that it went midway through New York, how does 4 5 that relate in any way causily, logically, in any way 6 whatsoever to whatever Madoff was running the Ponzi scheme, 7 to whether Madoff made a fraudulent transfer, or to whether 8 we received customer property? 9 Everything in their claim would be exactly the 10 same if the money had been routed in some other way or if we 11 had --12 THE COURT: I've heard you already. I've heard 13 enough. 14 MR. FOURMAUX: Okay. 15 THE COURT: You're beginning to repeat yourself 16 and I --17 MR. FOURMAUX: All right. 18 THE COURT: -- really get tired of repeating --19 repeat. 20 MR. FOURMAUX: Okay. Then if you have no other 21 questions, I'll rest, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: I do not have any other questions. 23 MR. FOURMAUX: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Feil, Mr. Friedman, any quick 25 response, and it better be exactly on point and a quick

Page 93 1 response. 2 MR. FEIL: Yeah, I'll just say in response to Mr. Lack, I did not say that they stipulated that the subsequent 3 transfer had customer property just that they had received 4 5 it. You can see in the transcript. 6 With respect to his contention that Congress is 7 intending to protect the entire chain of transfers, it's 8 true that Congress has amended the safe harbor and the 9 Courts have interpreted it liberally, but nobody, Congress 10 hasn't seen fit to add 550 to it. And I think Your Honor 11 gets that. 12 THE COURT: I knew that. 13 MR. FEIL: Okay. That's all I had. 14 THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Friedman, same thing, 15 any quick things that were brought up that were not argued 16 before that you just want to quickly address? 17 MR. FRIEDMAN: No, thank you, Your Honor, I think 18 we addressed everything. Thank you for your time. 19 THE COURT: Excellent. Very good. The Court will 20 issue a written decision and I am going to take a five 21 minute break before we begin the next one. 22 (Recessed at 11:42 a.m.; reconvened at 11:49 a.m.) 23 THE COURT: Good morning still. 24 UNIDENTIFIED: Good morning, Your Honor. 25 UNIDENTIFIED: Good morning.

Page 94 1 THE COURT: Oops. I keep turning myself off and 2 This is -- we're now on Adversary Proceeding 11-02149, 3 the Trustee Picard versus Banque SYZ & Company, SA. State 4 your name and affiliation. 5 MR. LEVIN: Good morning, Your Honor, Richard 6 Levin, Jenner & Block LLP appearing for Banque SYZ. 7 MR. CREMONA: Good morning, Your Honor, Nicholas 8 Cremona, Baker & Hostetler appearing on behalf of Irving 9 Picard as SIPA Trustee. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Levin, I believe this is your 11 motion. 12 MR. CREMONA: Your Honor, if I may --13 THE COURT: Oh, I'm so sorry. MR. CREMONA: Sorry to interrupt, I just wanted to 14 15 address a housekeeping matter at --16 THE COURT: Go ahead. 17 MR. CREMONA: -- the outset, Your Honor, because 18 you had asked about the Kingate transfers in the Multi-19 Strategy matter and the same applies here. I just wanted to 20 point Your Honor to a stipulation that we entered which is 21 at Docket 147 in this case, entered on December 12th, 2021. 22 And similar to the other case, we dismissed the Kingate Euro 23 transfers and the Kingate global subsequent transfers based 24 on the settlement and the recovery of those transfers. 25 that's why there was an adjustment and they're not discussed

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	Page 95
1	herein.
2	THE COURT: Okay. I have to say
3	MR. LEVIN: Your Honor
4	THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Levin, the docket is
5	not so clean. So sometimes we're new to this and trying to
6	find it. It is not necessarily simple. So, yes, Mr. Levin.
7	MR. LEVIN: Yeah, and just to confirm what Mr.
8	Cremona said and
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. LEVIN: noting that the stipulation did not
11	actually result in an amended complaint. The complaint
12	still has all of the Kingate allegations in it.
13	THE COURT: Okay. Okay. But let me just ask Mr.
14	Cremona. But isn't there a stipulation on the Multi-
15	Strategy or just an amended complaint?
16	MR. CREMONA: On Multi-Strategy I'll defer to Mr.
17	Feil. I don't know whether or not there was a stipulation
18	or if that was addressed in the complaint. In as Mr .
19	Levin said, in this action we stipulated solely to the
20	dismissal of the transfers that relate to Kingate and that's
21	all we accomplished with the stipulation that I referred to.
22	THE COURT: Okay. All right.
23	MR. LACK: Your Honor? Your Honor?
24	THE COURT: Yes, sir.
25	MR. LACK: In the Multi-Strategy case, at Document

Page 96 88, there is a stipulation which does dismiss the Kingate related claims and then there was an amended complaint which was in accordance with that and did not include the Kingate. THE COURT: I'm sorry to take y'all's time on this. We're just trying to get everything straightened out. Very good. Mr. Levin, it's your motion. MR. LEVIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I know you're well prepared on these matters so before I started, I wanted to know if there was anything specifically you wanted me to address or any questions before I start my prepared remarks. THE COURT: Thank you. I tried to be prepared and I actually want to hear you first and I think questions may come up that I come back to you on, but let's just hear you first. MR. LEVIN: Fine. All right. I'll proceed. And honestly, if y'all will -- not THE COURT: necessarily emphasize but add to your papers, because we've really gone over the papers. MR. LEVIN: Yes, understood. So if you'll -- right, thank you. THE COURT: MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, the first issue, the first item of business is we filed a request for judicial notice. The Trustee did not object to that request so we ask that

judicial notice be taken of the documents that are a part

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Page 97 1 of that request. 2 THE COURT: That are on the docket already? 3 MR. LEVIN: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. I can always take judicial 4 5 notice of something that's on the docket. I don't 6 necessarily have to take judicial notice of what's in the 7 docket -- in the document, so --8 MR. LEVIN: Well, our request, Your Honor, spells 9 out exactly what we're seeking, it's a written request, it's 10 on the docket with all of the documents attached as exhibits 11 to the request and it spells out exactly what we are seeking 12 judicial notice of, whether it is the existence of the 13 document, or in some cases, the contents of the document. 14 MR. CREMONA: Your Honor, sorry to interrupt --15 THE COURT: Yes, sir? 16 MR. CREMONA: -- this is Nicholas Cremona, I 17 apologize for interrupting. But while we did not object to 18 the concept of matters being taken on judicial notice, we 19 intend to address here today the purpose for which those 20 documents can or cannot be used and the appropriateness on a 21 motion to dismiss, which I intend to address in my 22 presentation. THE COURT: Okay. I -- that's what's important to 23 24 Obviously I take judicial notice of anything that's 25 But a judicial notice can't be used for the truth of filed.

08-01789-cgm Doc 21660-3 Filed 05/27/22 Entered 05/27/22 15:24:27 Exhibit 3 Pg 99 of 203 Page 98 1 the matter asserted and that's just blanket. 2 I can take judicial notice of -- if it's been 3 filed. I can take judicial notice of it's here. And I will do that, but that's just that it's filed and it's before the 4 5 Court. Very good. 6 MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, I don't want to beat this 7 too much, but for example, the motion to dismiss assumes the 8 facts in the complaint to be true and similarly --9 THE COURT: I have to. I have to. 10 MR. LEVIN: Yes, yes. And we're -- similarly, 11 we're assuming the documents that are referenced in the 12 complaint, which we ask the Court to -- which are attached 13 to our request for judicial notice, we assumed those to be 14 true. 15 THE COURT: I cannot do that. That's not what the 16 law says and you know that's not what -- excuse me. 17 not what it says. That sounds like evidence to me and if 18 that's evidence, we will be in the courtroom and the 19 evidence will be there. 20 I take judicial notice of the fact that the 21 document was filed, that's all I will do. And, yes, you may 22 rebut it, but I'm taking judicial notice of the fact that 23 it's been filed.

detail, Your Honor, I'll let the written request speak for

MR. LEVIN: I will not go over our request in

24

1 itself.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, I want to address a preliminary issue before getting into the grounds that we have asserted for our motion to dismiss.

We have five grounds unlike Multi-Strategy, we overlap on three of them but there are two additional ones. But there's a preliminary issue that I want to mention and I think this is really important understanding the context of this case.

This case is about -- this adversary proceeding is about an investment that Bank SYZ made with Sentry, not an investment that Bank SYZ made with BLMIS. The Sentry offering memorandum which the complaint references stated Sentry intended to use the funds to invest in U.S. securities, that Sentry maintained an account at BLMIS, which was a broker dealer, it needed to maintain an account to trade in U.S. securities. And that BLMIS would manage the investment, in effect be the investment manager.

Neither the complaint nor the facts as the world now knows them support any theory that Banque SYZ or any other Sentry investor who did not have actual knowledge that BLMIS was not trading securities, was investing with BLMIS or in BLMIS as if BLMIS were a fund in which one could invest.

Anymore than if I might call a broker at Charles
Schwab and send money with instructions to buy shares of
Apple or General Motors or any other U.S. securities, I'm
investing in Charles Schwab, I'm not. And even if my broker
there steals all my money, I still didn't make an investment
in Charles Schwab.

An here, the Sentry -- Banque SYZ was investing in Sentry and Sentry was using the money that it got from all of its investors to invest in U.S. securities using BLMIS as its broker dealer and effective events manager.

The Second Circuit recognized this distinction in the Ida Fishman case. And I'm going to quote on page 421 of the Fishman case. The account documents establish that BLMIS and its customers manifested their mutual assent that BLMIS would conduct securities transactions on the customer's behalf pursuant to specific investment strategy. Now, here the customer BLMIS with Sentry, not Banque SYZ.

Going on with the quote, of course, BLMIS secretly intended to violate the agreement by using the deposits to fund the ongoing Ponzi scheme, but this is of no moment.

This was talking -- getting to the point of whether Fishman, in that case it was a 546(e) case.

And this distinction is important to remember when analyzing the relationships among BLMIS, Sentry and Banque SYZ. Banque SYZ was an investor in Sentry.

Page 101 1 Did you just turn your camera off or --2 THE COURT: I did accidentally, thank you, I 3 apologize. MR. LEVIN: Okay. No problem. 5 THE COURT: I'm struggling with making this camera 6 work. MR. LEVIN: Well, I don't mind if it's off, I just 7 8 wanted to make sure I wasn't -- I shouldn't --9 THE COURT: No, I want you to read my tells. 10 MR. LEVIN: I looked for those. 11 THE COURT: I'll leave it on. 12 MR. LEVIN: Okay. So this distinction is 13 important to remember when analyzing the relationships among 14 to BLMIS and Sentry and Banque SYZ. SYZ was an investor in 15 Sentry and Sentry obtained investors such as Banque SYZ on 16 the basis that Sentry was an investor in U.S. securities, 17 not in BLMIS. That turned out not to be true at the end of 18 the day, but at least that's what Sentry represented to its 19 investors. 20 And to the extent that the Trustee argues that 21 Sentry was not investing in U.S. securities because it knew 22 BLMIS -- Sentry was not investing, because it knew BLMIS was 23 not investing in U.S. securities. That's the allegation in 24 the Fairfield amended complaint. The Second Circuit's statement applies equally. 25

Sentry agreed with its investors, including Banque SYZ that it would invest in U.S. securities, whether it secretly intended to violate that agreement is of no moment.

So I want to set that as a context for the arguments that I'm going to make. The first point, Your Honor, is that as we said in our memorandum, the -- one of the essential elements of an action to recover customer property from a subsequent transferee is that the initial transfer be avoidable.

And the complaint must sufficiently allege avoidability or actually avoided. It's already been avoided, but here, just avoidability. The only allegation of substance of any -- other than just the bare assertion that it's avoidable, that the initial transfers to Sentry were avoidable is by incorporation by reference of the Fairfield amended complaint.

There are three reasons why that is not proper in this case. First, Rule 10(c) which permits incorporation by reference does not permit wholesale incorporation from another action and the incorporation must specifically identify the allegations being incorporated, not all 217 pages, 798 allegations and 101 exhibits.

Second, this incorporated complaint has been superseded. It's no longer operative and it's based on superseded legal principles as we note from the Citibank

case.

And third, the incorporated complaint does -- now this goes to Rule 8(a) which requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement, it does not contain a short and plain statement of the claim. And it would expand the scope of this litigation well beyond the main issues of avoidability and recovery with extensive allegations and exhibits that are irrelevant to the Trustee's complaint in this action.

As such, we believe the wholesale incorporation should be stricken with the result of the complaint against Banque SYZ does not adequately allege that the Sentry transfers from BLMIS were avoidable, which is an essential element.

As we said in our reply brief, Your Honor, we do not object to the Trustee's amendment of the complaint to allege only the relevant facts to frame the issue for this case. We just don't want to deal with all of their claims against all of the Fairfield defendants. This relates only to Sentry and only to the avoidability of the initial transfers to Sentry.

I want to move to the second grounds for our motion to dismiss, Your Honor, which is the safe harbor of Section 546(e). I'm going to adopt Mr. Lack's arguments, except to the extent they were specific to the facts of his

case, but on the general points I want to adopt those and just add a few words without repeating, maybe a different emphasis than he had.

The safe harbor, by its express terms, prohibits avoidance and therefore recovery of transfers made more than two years before bankruptcy. It's absolute. There are no exceptions. And the Second Circuit has said we look askance at any objections and has denied other attempts to find exceptions to the safe harbor.

And that would end this litigation, since the alleged initial transfers here, to the extent we can determine which ones the complaint is referring to, were made more than two years before bankruptcy.

But as the safe harbor has been construed in this case by both Judge Rakoff and by this court, the -- there has been an exception, a judicially created exception to the safe harbor. And that exception is that the safe harbor cannot be invoked by a transferee who had actual knowledge that BLMIS was not trading securities.

We disagree with that ruling. We wish to preserve the issue for appeal, but we recognize it's law of the case so we're going to go on that basis for now, Your Honor.

Oh, and to answer your earlier question, Banque SYZ was also a party to the Cohmad proceeding, so we are bound by that as well in the case here.

THE COURT: I was thinking the same thing.

MR. LEVIN: Now, Judge Rakoff's judicially created exception was narrow, and when a Court creates an exception to a very absolute clear congressional command, that exception should be construed very narrowly. And Judge Rakoff made clear the reason for the exception was designed to strip protection from those who knew there were no securities transactions.

That applies equally to initial transferees without knowledge and it should apply, if you take the logic of his opinion creating this exception, it should apply equally to subsequent transferees without knowledge. And there's no allegation here that Banque SYZ knew there were no underlying securities transactions.

In addition, going back to the Ida Fishman case from the Second Circuit, it's 773 F3d 411, the Court ruled that the phrase in connection with, quote, in Section 546(e) sets a low bar for the required relationship between the securities contract and the transfers sought to be avoided.

Because the Trustee here alleges that the redemption payments that Banque SYZ received from Sentry were customer property withdrawn from BLMIS to fund the redemptions, the allegation is that the withdrawals were transfers in connection with the securities contract between Sentry and Banque SYZ. And as such, even if Sentry had

actual knowledge that BLMIS was not trading, the benefit of the safe harbor here is for Banque SYZ who was the party to a securities contract between it and Sentry.

I'll move on to the customer property issue, Your Honor, and again I want to echo Mr. Lack's argument, except with respect to the specifics of the transfer of Multi-Strategy because our facts are a little bit different.

Despite the Trustee's exercise to frame this as a tracing -- I'm sorry, the Trustee's attempt to frame this as a tracing exercise, we do not believe this is a question for expert opinion, but it's a legal question of not what the facts are, that's for trial.

The question here is does the complaint plausibly allege that the transfers in question contain customer property. Because if the complaint doesn't plausibly allege that, you don't get to trial. So the complaint has to make plausible allegations.

First, in this case, first the Trustee doesn't identify which of the initial transfers of customer property were allegedly transferred to Banque SYZ. He simply lists a bunch of BLMIS to Sentry transfers and does not tie any initial transfers to any transfer from Sentry to Banque SYZ. They're just broad generalities, no specifics and that is not adequate under Iqbal and Twombly.

And second, in our case, there's an enormous time

gap that makes it implausible that the funds Sentry
transferred to Banque SYZ were customer property that Sentry
received from BLMIS.

If you look at page 33 of our memorandum, Your Honor, we have a table which is a summary of the transfers alleged just within the four corners of our complaint without looking at the 70 some other complaints that the Trustee has brought.

And this -- the plausibility problem here is that as you can see from that table, BLMIS transferred money to Sentry. Sentry transferred enormous amounts of money back to BLMIS, comparable amounts and yet, somehow the Trustee says it's plausible that despite a billion and a half dollars of transfers from Sentry to BLMIS, that's before the transfers to Banque SYZ, despite a billion and a half dollars of transfers somehow, without saying how, without any specifics, without any details, somehow Sentry set aside some money of customer property that it received and it used that money to pay Banque SYZ.

So if you expand this table to include the 70 some other complaints as we explained in our memorandum, Sentry transferred out over \$7 billion of money and took in from BLMIS under \$3 billion of money.

So while it's conceivable that there was customer property that found its way to Banque SYZ, Iqbal and Twombly

require more than conceivable, they require that it be -that the claim be plausible that that was customer property.

And again without the details and we believe under the
Trustee's agreement with the Sentry liquidator, the Trustee
had access to the Sentry bank records to provide those
details. Without those details, the claim that Banque SYZ
received customer property is not plausibly alleged.

Again, we have no objection if the Trustee -- to the Trustee amending its complaint if he can, to plausibly allege that the funds that Banque SYZ received were customer property, and to show the connection, we just say that he hasn't done so so far.

Your Honor, I want to turn Section 550(b)(1), which is an affirmative defense. And ordinarily, an affirmative defense is not -- cannot be used on a motion to dismiss. But if the complaint itself has adequate allegations, which are accepted as true, that support the affirmative defense, the Court may dismiss on the affirmative defense. We made that point, we cited that in our brief and cited the case law for that.

Now, the affirmative defense here 550(b)(1) gives the subsequent transferee an affirmative defense if the transferee takes three elements, takes for value, in good faith, and without knowledge of avoidability of the transfer avoided.

The first value, we address that in memorandum.

We believe there was adequate consideration for the transfer between Sentry and Banque SYZ. That's what's required by value here. I'm not going to spend anymore time on that.

But I want to focus on good faith for a moment.

Citibank decision last August defines what's required for the good faith element. It has three components.

The first component is what facts the defendant subjectively knew. The second component is whether those facts put the transferee on inquiry notice of the fraudulent purpose of the transfer.

And in this case, the transfer we're talking about is the subsequent transfer from Sentry to Banque SYZ, just as the value analysis is from Banque SYZ to Sentry. It's at that level, that subsequent transfer level.

And the third element is if so, whether diligent inquiry by the transferee, here Banque SYZ, would have discovered the fraudulent purpose of the transfer, the transfer being the transfer from Sentry to Banque SYZ.

Now, why do I say that that element is tested at the subsequent transfer level, not at the initial transfer level? Because the third element is, without knowledge of the voidability of the avoided transfer. And the avoided transfer is the transfer that occurs between BLMIS and Sentry. That's directed at the initial transfer.

And that's how the statute picks up the subsequent transferee who knew too much. If the subsequent transferee had knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided, then even if he was in good faith between the subsequent transferee and the initial transferee, the subsequent transferee will be liable.

So the statute itself separates those two concepts. Turning to good faith and looking at good faith at the Sentry to Banque SYZ level, it's Banque SYZ's good faith in accepting the transfer from Sentry.

Going back to the Citibank test. The first two elements of that test, subjective knowledge and whether that would put a reasonable investor on inquiry notice are not addressed in the complaint, and I don't propose that we can address them here on a motion to dismiss.

But the third element, which must be met for the good faith test, is whether a diligent inquiry would have discovered the fraudulent purpose of the transaction.

That is purely a hypothetical test. Would have discovered is hypothetical. It's not an actual what did they discover. Obviously if the subsequent transferee had actual knowledge of those securities transfers, of course then they would have knowledge of avoidability of the transfer, of the initial transfer.

But here, Citibank is looking at a hypothetical

test. And a hypothetical test is not subject to fact discovery. As the Trustee's claim in his opposition that there are myriad unknown facts critical to opposing a good faith defense is wrong. It's based on pre-Citibank law, which didn't impose this particular hypothetical test.

In this case, the complaint -- I'm going to assume that the first two of two elements of the Citibank test are met. And the only question is whether the third one. Here -- assume without admitting of course.

However, the complaint here includes new -numerous allegations about whether a diligent inquiry would
have discovered the fraudulent purpose of the transfer from
Sentry to Banque SYZ.

So the third element can be addressed now. The complaint effectively alleges that if an investor had conducted a diligent inquiry of Sentry, it would have found -- it would not have found a fraudulent purpose in Sentry's making the redemption payments.

Section 7.E of the Fairfield amended complaint, which is incorporated by reference, of course, we're assuming the incorporation is adequate for these purposes, but we still maintain the Court should not permit the incorporation. But if it is incorporated, Section 7.E is headed, quote, the defendant's deceive their investors.

These are the Fairfield defendants. And it goes on for 12

Page 112 paragraphs detailing the grave extent to which Sentry's management prevented any investors from discovering anything about Sentry's operations. I've already addressed the third element, knowledge avoidability which should be tested at the initial transfer level. And in this case, there's no basis to conclude that Banque SYZ could -- even could have known about -- sorry, let me say that again. There's no basis that Banque SYZ could even have known about the avoidability of the initial transfers because the Trustee doesn't even -- because there's no allegation that the Trustee -- I'm sorry. I'm going to take a breath, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead. But let me just ask you a question then while you're taking a breath. Are you saying that good faith is to Fairfield and knowledge is to BLMIS, is that what you're saying to me? MR. LEVIN: That's what 550(b)(1) says, good faith -- took the transfer in good faith. Where did the transfer come from? It came from the initial transferee, not from

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVIN: And took the transfer without knowledgeability of the transfer avoided, which is the initial transfer. So the statute itself distinguishes

the debtor. Took the transferee in good faith.

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between those two steps in the process. And that's what I'm saying.

And here, the complaint does not allege that

Banque SYZ even could have known about the initial

transfers, that the Trustee alleges, let alone that they

might be voidable. So that third test is satisfied for the

affirmative defense.

Your Honor, I'll go on for just briefly one additional issue. Even if good faith is tested by whether Banque SYZ was in good faith with respect to Madoff. That's not what the statute says, but I'm sure that's the Trustee's position. That -- the statute requires actual knowledge, not inquiry knowledge, not good faith, actual knowledge of the voidability.

But if we assume otherwise that the good faith applies at the initial transfer level, the complaint again sets forth allegations to show that the -- Banque SYZ could not have determined the fraudulent purpose of the transfers as the Citibank case says.

Suppose for example, the Trustee had alleged in his complaint that BLMIS was such an expert at concealing his fraud that no one, no matter how expert an investigator could have gotten through the web of lies and deceit to discover the fraud. That would surely meet the Citibank good faith test by establishing the diligent inquiry by the

defendant could not have discovered the fraud.

Now, we're not saying that the Trustee made such categorical statements in his complaint, no. He did not.

Rather, he alleged that a thorough investigation by both an independent hedge fund research and advisory firm and by the SEC with its greater investigatory powers and subpoena powers and regulatory powers did not discover the fraudulent purpose of the transfers. And that's very close to saying the same thing.

So on that basis, we believe that even if the good faith is tested at the initial transfer level, rather than knowledge avoidability being transferred at the initial transfer level, that the affirmative defense is satisfied.

Finally, Your Honor, and I appreciate your patience, I'd like to move on to personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEVIN: Again, I want to adopt Mr. Fourmaux's points with respect to imputation and with respect to the subscription agreements on personal jurisdiction.

But let me start by saying that the complaint, any complaint must contain specific allegations sufficient to make it plausible that the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant. It's not enough for the plaintiff alleging conclusory terms, only the defendant had minimum contacts or that defendant purposefully availed

itself of the laws and protections of the United States, in the hopes that those allegations would permit discovery that might reveal a basis for personal jurisdiction. Iqbal and Twombly made clear, conclusory allegations are not sufficient.

Here, with respect to the alleged subsequent transfers, the Trustee alleges little more than that. In paragraph 6 of the complaint, he says only, Banque SYZ knowingly directed funds to be invested with New York based BLMIS through Madoff feeder funds and Banque SYZ knowingly received transfers of customer property from BLMIS by withdrawing money from the feeder funds.

Now, those are conclusory allegations, especially Banque SYZ knowingly received customer property from BLMIS by withdrawing. That is a complete conclusory allegation, no sufficient detail for that.

And therefore, they're inadequate. Their formulaic recitation of the elements of personal jurisdiction devoid of the specific facts necessary to support them.

Now, I know Mr. Cremona filed the declaration, in which he makes numerous other allegations, which are not referenced in the complaint. And as we pointed out in our papers, one may not amend the complaint by an opposition to a motion to dismiss. If the Trustee needs to amend the

complaint, it should be through a proper amendment of the complaint.

But, second, even if these allegations, these broad conclusory allegations were true, the first allegation would not support specific personal jurisdiction. And now I go back to what I said in my opening remarks, Your Honor.

Banque SYZ invested in Sentry, a non-US legal entity, not in BLMIS. Sentry did not invest with or in BLMIS, at least it intended to invest in U.S. securities using BLMIS as its broker dealer and Banque SYZ invested only in Sentry, not BLMIS.

And the only reason we're here today is because BLMIS reached its agreement with Sentry to invest in U.S. securities resulting in this SIPA proceeding. It -- but it must be the defendant's activities that give rise to personal jurisdiction. The mere fact that Madoff breached its agreement and defrauded thousands of people does not all of a sudden make Banque SYZ subject to personal jurisdiction in this matter.

And I want to mention, Your Honor, Judge

Bernstein's decision in what we refer to as Fairfield 1,

which is the August 6th, 2018 decision. He ruled that the

Sentry investors, including Banque SYZ, which was a party to

that proceeding were not subject to personal -- specific

personal jurisdiction in New York in an action by their

counterparty, the Sentry fund itself, the party that Banque SYZ had contracted with on account of their investments in Sentry.

Said, the subscription agreement was not enough and that was the agreement under which the investment was made and was the basis -- I'm sorry, that was the basis on which the investment was made.

And here, the Sentry Fund itself, through its liquidators, the counterparty that Banque SYZ tried to sue Banque SYZ in New York and Judge Bernstein said wait a minute, your investment in Sentry through the subscription agreement is not an inadequate basis for jurisdiction in New York, for recovery of the redemption payments that Sentry made to its investors. There would have to be another basis.

If the -- Banque SYZ' counterparty could not sue Banque SYZ in New York on personal jurisdiction on account of those investments, how is it that Sentry's counterparty in which BLM -- in which Banque SYZ had no connection or no relationship. How could it sue, or through its Trustee sue on personal jurisdiction in New York? So we think the Fairfield 1 decision supports our argument.

Now, this complaint different from the Multi-Strategy complaint --

THE COURT: Okay. Just let me mention one thing.

Pg 119 of 203 Page 118 1 MR. LEVIN: Yeah. 2 THE COURT: We haven't determined personal 3 jurisdiction in Fairfield yet, so. MR. LEVIN: Correct. What he has said is, that 5 the investment through the subscription agreement is not 6 adequate, there has to be some other basis. THE COURT: Okay. Because that's an open issue in 7 8 Fairfield. 9 MR. LEVIN: Yes, it is. And my point here, Your 10 Honor, is simply to say that the BLI case which has been 11 argued back and forth, this seems contrary to that, because 12 the subscription agreement made clear through the offering 13 memorandum that the funds that Sentry received from its 14 investors would be invested in U.S. securities in New York. 15 So that fact was very much before Judge Bernstein 16 and he ruled that that was not enough. So at best, that --17 and that is with full knowledge of the BLI decision and he 18 ruled that way anyway. 19 So we think that is -- and that -- we think that 20 is good law here and Banque SYZ was a party to that proceeding. I know the Trustee wasn't, but Banque SYZ was 21 22 and we think that's the -- should be the law in this case. 23 THE COURT: We're talking about purposeful

availment, we're not talking about contract (indiscernible)

so.

24

1 MR. LEVIN: Well, the purposeful -- agreed, 2 The purposeful availment alleged here is the 3 They use the contract to purposefully avail contract. themselves of investment in U.S. securities. But Banque SYZ 4 5 never invested in U.S. securities, it invested in Sentry. 6 You know, any -- you know, let's go back to my 7 broker at Charles Schwab. If I invest in -- let's say I'm a 8 foreign investor and I invest in a foreign mutual fund and 9 that foreign mutual fund signs up with Charles Schwab to 10 make investments and Schwab steals the money, that doesn't 11 mean the investors in that fund all of a sudden became 12 subject to U.S. jurisdiction simply because they knew that 13 their fund, or their company, their industrial company, 14 their financial company, whatever, would make investments in 15 the United States, even though they knew they would make 16 investments in the United States. 17 Now, the fraud, Madoff's fraud does not all of a 18 sudden bring Banque SYZ into the United States when it was 19 separated by Sentry, so. 20 THE COURT: As you've already said, that alone 21 maybe is not enough. Okay. 22 MR. LEVIN: Right, okay. 23 THE COURT: I heard you. 24 MR. LEVIN: Now, the complaint alleges one other 25 basis for personal -- specific personal jurisdiction over

Banque SYZ, that it opened the ISOS fund account at BLMIS.

That too is inadequate. Specific personal jurisdiction relates only to the transaction that is the subject of the litigation. The ISOS account was opened after the transactions alleged in the complaint. You can't retroactively create personal jurisdiction with respect to a transaction.

And, in fact, the cases we cite make clear and the Supreme Court has made clear, that you look at this on a transaction by transaction basis, but there are two cases that we cited involving -- the one case, two separate contracts between the same counterparties. And the Court looked at personal jurisdiction with respect to each contract independently.

It didn't say, I mean, let's assume a hypothetical. A New York party contracts with Swiss party on contract A, and a little while later, contracts with contract party -- I'm sorry, contracts in New York on contract day and a little while later contracts in Switzerland on contract B. And a dispute arises over contract B.

The cases say that the New York courts would not have specific personal jurisdiction with respect to contract B which was all done in Switzerland, even though contract A was done in New York by the same parties. And we cite the

cases to that effect. So that's one point.

And here the account was opened later, so it can't relate back. And it's not enough to just say, oh, well, this all relates to BLMIS, you know, it's all Madoff, and therefore, it's the same thing. No, it's transaction by transaction as those cases show.

Now, in addition, the papers show the allegations are that Banque SYZ opened the account as an agent for ISOS fund, not in its -- it used its name, but it used its name as agent, it said the account state -- the account name is Banque SYZ reference ISOS. And then it's filed with BLMIS, an IRS form that says we are not opening this account in our own name or opening it as an agent for a third party.

So the documents were clear about that. And that too is another reason why the opening of the ISOS account is not adequate for specific jurisdiction over the prior initial and subsequent transfers alleged in the complaint.

So the Trustee says, ah, but Banque SYZ filed a proof of claim in this case for ISOS. And the ISOS proof of claim equally makes clear that it was filed as agent for ISOS fund.

And as we explained in our memorandum, SIPA itself and the SIPC rules say that where a party holds an account as an agent, it is to be distinguished from any account in its own name. And here it was clear that Banque SYZ was an

Page 122 1 agent for ISOS fund and therefore should be distinguished. 2 So -- and that takes me to the last point which is 3 Count II of the complaint, Your Honor, the disallowance of The Trustee makes no allegations of any 4 the ISOS claim. transfers to ISOS fund, makes no allegations of anything 5 6 wrong with the ISOS fund claim. 7 The only basis for disallowance of the claim is 8 502(b) based on transfers to its agent Banque SYZ and SIPA 9 and the SIPC rules as we cited make clear that that's not 10 enough, and therefore, the Count II should be dismissed and 11 the ISOS claim should be allowed. 12 Open to questions, Your Honor, otherwise I've 13 concluded. 14 THE COURT: I think I through them out as you were 15 going along. 16 MR. LEVIN: Great. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Cremona. 18 MR. CREMONA: Thank you, Your Honor. I guess it's good afternoon at this point. 19 20 THE COURT: I guess we made it to that, yes. 21 MR. CREMONA: I intend to focus on defendant's 22 arguments made on reply and as stated here today, and also to establish similar ground rules at the outset for 23 24 completeness of the record on the matter, I would 25 incorporate the arguments made by my colleague Mr. Feil

concerning 546(e) and its inapplicability to the instant action, as he just argued in the Multi-Strategy case 12-01205, as well as the plausibility of the Trustee's allegations that the transfers in these cases are comprised of stolen customer property.

I'll do my best, Your Honor, to supplement those points, only to the extent that Mr. Levin has augmented his colleague's points. Likewise, I would incorporate the arguments and the relevant precedence argued by my colleague Mr. Friedman concerning the appropriateness of this Court's exercising personal jurisdiction over this defendant. And will likewise do my best only to supplement those arguments to the extent specific issues have been raised by Mr. Levin and to address the specific facts of this case.

THE COURT: (indiscernible) you and Mr. Levin for that, it actually keeps my mind a little clear, so I appreciate that, thank you.

MR. CREMONA: Thank you, Your Honor. With that background I will proceed.

Again, while your -- while the defendant today has made many arguments in an effort to retain that stolen customer property to the detriment of the net loser victims, those arguments are belied by the plausible allegations in the complaint, involve questions of fact that are not appropriate for determination on a motion to dismiss, and in

any event, must be rejected as based on the law of this case.

And I'll take the arguments in the order that Mr. Levin just made them. First, the defendant maintains that the Trustee has failed to plausibly allege the avoidability of the initial transfers by incorporating the allegations relating to Fairfield's actual knowledge, as alleged in the Fairfield amended complaint, which is set forth at paragraph 63 in the complaint in this case.

The defendant argues that would violate Rule 10(c) and Rule 8 and I would submit, Your Honor, that is wrong for a number of reasons, including that the defendant expressly conceded that point in multiple ways in his brief, and in fact, just now we heard him rely on those same allegations multiple times in his presentation.

And just briefly, Your Honor, as set forth in our papers, the incorporation by reference is totally appropriate under Rule 10(c), relying on the Geiger case, which is at 446 B.R. 670. It's directly on point, despite the arguments made in reply that permitted the incorporation by reference under 10(c) of pleadings in a different adversary proceeding within the same liquidation, because it was under the umbrella of the debtor's bankruptcy case.

I would submit, Your Honor, the facts here are identical. We have the umbrella of the SIPA liquidation and

multiple adversary proceedings within that case.

Next, Your Honor, again briefly we cited to the district court's decision in the 550 consolidated proceeding in our papers. And there, the district court already found that incorporation by reference in the exact same manner, mainly as set forth in paragraph 63 through 65 in the instant complaint, was entirely appropriate when it reviewed a nearly identical complaint and determined that Section 550(a) only requires the Trustee to show that the transfer he seeks to recover is avoidable in each recovery action and found sufficient the Trustee's incorporation by reference of the then operating Fairfield complaint.

I would also point out that Banque SYZ

participated in that proceeding before the district court,

they're listed in the exhibit of all participating

defendants, which is at 12MC115 Docket No. 314 at entry No.

15 on page 10 of 15.

Despite defendant's participation in that proceeding, it somehow challenges the application in effect of that decision in their reply. They claim it doesn't apply because it only was applied to a quote/unquote representative case, which is at their reply on page 2.

However, the Court specifically noted that all the participants to that proceeding were alleged to have received avoidable transfers from Fairfield and Kingate just

like SYZ here, and the Court was determining whether the Trustee had alleged -- adequately alleged the initial transfers of Fairfield as avoidable based on the same allegations incorporated here before the Trustee could recover from the participating defendants there, like SYZ.

And so I would submit, Your Honor, that that decision which is 501 B.R. 26 is law of the case and clearly binding on this precedent, who participated in that proceeding.

Moreover, regardless of the incorporation, Your

Honor, the Trustee submits that you can take judicial notice

of Your Honor's decision finding that the Fairfield second

amended complaint sufficiently alleges the avoidability of

the initial transfers.

That was previously determined by Your Honor at 2021 Westlaw 3477479. And I would point out, while Mr. Levin in his reply tries to distinguish the cases that we relied upon, our case here is even stronger.

And it's an important distinction that makes our request stronger under the cases, is that we incorporated the complaint at issue expressly by reference at paragraph 63 of the operative complaint.

And, you know, providing the defendants with the requisite notice they claimed they didn't have. They've been on notice of the incorporated allegations for over 11

years, since we filed our complaint in this action in May of 2011.

The other Courts were relying on permitted incorporation on a different subsequent complaints, based on requests after the fact, and still took judicial notice generally pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b).

So -- but again putting aside the appropriateness of the incorporation, beyond what Mr. Levin conceded here today on the record, I would refer Your Honor to his declaration which is at ECF No. 151. As he said, it's his declaration and request for judicial notice.

He specifically in that document requests that this Court take judicial notice of the Fairfield amended complaint and the second amended complaint at Exhibits B and D respectively to his declaration. And he notes, quote, the allegations in the complaint are incorporated by reference in a complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). That's ECF No. 151 at page 5.

So I find it interesting that Mr. Levin objects to this Court's ability to take judicial notice of its own decision finding that the trustee plausibly alleged Fairfield's actual knowledge, while simultaneously asking this Court to take judicial notice of the very same complaint.

I submit, Your Honor, that the defendant cannot maintain these contradictory positions. Likewise, defendant's argument that it is unable to respond to the allegations establishing Fairfield's actual knowledge as incorporated by reference in the complaint herein is belied, I would say again in the first instance by what Mr. Levin said today in reciting those very same allegations, but also by his acknowledgement in his reply that the allegations in that complaint sufficiently allege the avoidability of the initial transfers based on Fairfield's actual knowledge.

In his reply at page 2, he states, Banque SYZ does not claim that the Fairfield amended complaint insufficiently alleges avoidability of the initial transfers and admits that the Court in Fairfield, quote, concluded that the operative complaint alleged that the various initial transferees, including Sentry, had actual knowledge of BLMIS' fraud. That's at the reply at page 6.

Again, Your Honor, on the one hand defendant claims it does not know which allegations concerning Fairfield's actual knowledge have been incorporated and that it must respond to, but at the same time, he can readily ascertain from reviewing those same allegations that the Trustee has plausibly alleged actual knowledge. Again, I submit that the defendant cannot credibly maintain both positions.

And for these reasons, I submit that the incorporation of the Fairfield amended complaint by reference is entirely appropriate and plausibly alleges the avoidability of the initial transfers.

Unless Your Honor has any questions, I'll move on to my next topic.

THE COURT: Please, go ahead, thank you.

MR. CREMONA: Next, Banque SYZ as we heard Mr.

Levin today assert that its good faith and value defenses

are established on the face of the complaint. They are not.

First, by their very nature affirmative defenses under Section 550(b) are fact driven, requiring a factual analysis and a presentation of evidence. That sort of factual analysis is not appropriate at this stage of the litigation, particularly with respect to a good faith defense.

In their reply papers, again defendant -- they first argue that its value defense under Section 550(b) is established somehow in the face of the complaint. However, as much as the defendant tries to avoid this Court's finding in Your Honor's Fairfield decision, Your Honor previously held, quote, as to whether the defendants gave value in the form of surrendering shares in the Fairfield funds, such a determination could not be made as a matter of law or fact at this stage, end quote. That's at 2021 Westlaw 3477479 at

page 8.

Excuse me, Your Honor. Similarly, defendants argue that its good faith defense has also been established on the face of the complaint. That is also not the case.

The Trustee submitted a recent decision from the district court, Picard v ABN Ambro which is at 20 CID 2586 and it was decided on May 2, 2022. We submitted that supplemental authority, Your Honor, because it was issued after the close of briefing in this matter. I submit to Your Honor, this is dispositive of this good faith issue and this affirmative defense.

In that case, as here, the appellees asked the bankruptcy court to determine that the Section 550(b) good faith defense appeared on the face of the complaint and rendered the Trustee's claim subject to dismissal.

The district court held that a good faith -- that the good faith -- excuse me, that good faith is an affirmative defense, that the similarly situated defendants bear the burden of proving and that the Second Circuit made clear in its decision in Citibank that the inquiry notice standard requires quote, a fact intensive inquiry to be determined on a case by case basis which naturally takes into account the disparate circumstances of differently situated transferees. And they cited to Citibank.

The Court noted that such a fact based

determination can only be made on the entirety of the factual record after discovery which has not occurred here, noting that good faith inquiry notice -- the good faith inquiry notice standard is difficult to resolve even at the summary judgment stage, much less at the pleading stage.

So, Your Honor, for those reasons, I submit that these defenses should be rejected as directly overruled and the motion denied. Again, unless Your Honor has questions on that, I'll move forward to the next affirmative defense.

THE COURT: Please, move forward.

MR. CREMONA: Next, Your Honor, Banque SYZ asserted that its 546(e) defense is established on the face of the complaint. And again, without reiterating all of the arguments previously made, I think I will just try to hit the highlights.

As we've said 546(e) by its expressed terms does not apply. It applies to avoidance not recovery. As Mr. Levin acknowledged, SYZ was a party to the Cohmad consolidated proceeding and is bound by the ruling. I would submit that Mr. Levin's reading of the ruling there in a vacuum is just incorrect.

As my colleague Mr. Feil went through in detail the second paragraph of that decision, the Court need not get to because once the avoidability of the initial transfer has been established based on the actual knowledge of the

initial transferee, that ends the inquiry.

and I think it's particularly important to point out just briefly again, the Court in BNP, this Court specifically addressed the very same argument as Mr. Feil laid out. And somehow the defendants don't acknowledge that the very same issue is before this Court and there the Court denied the application of 546(e) and denied consideration of the subsequent transferee's actual knowledge. And I would submit the same outcome is appropriate here, Your Honor, and that's based on the law of the case in the form of Cohmad and BNP.

I'm just -- and then just moving forward, I think the other aspects have been covered. Unless Your Honor has specific questions, I will move on to customer property.

THE COURT: Great, thank you.

MR. CREMONA: Thank you, Your Honor.

So again, in SYZ's reply at page 10, SYZ acknowledges that its central point is that the Trustee has alleged billions of dollars more in subsequent transfers than the initial transfers that -- and that somehow results in the exhaustion of the customer property at issue in any particular case and somehow in this case.

First of all, Your Honor, what the defendant is asking you to do is beyond applying an incorrect pleading burden, is also to look beyond the plausible allegations in

this complaint and consider voluminous materials beyond the four corners of the complaint, including as Mr. Levin said here today, approximately 80 -- the complaints in 80 other actions and look to those pleadings to determine whether the trustee's allegations in this case are plausible. And I would refer Your Honor to -- that's Mr. Levin's declaration at ECF 151 at Exhibit 1.

And that's simply inappropriate, Your Honor, on a motion to dismiss because this Court is confined to the four corners of this complaint to make that determination.

And in the first instance, this Court acknowledged that the Trustee is entitled to sue multiple subsequent transferees to recover the same customer property until he has been fully satisfied.

The fact that the Trustee sued numerous defendants to recover a portion of the same \$3 billion and the aggregate demand amounts against those subsequent transfer — in those subsequent transfer of cases exceed that amount is totally unremarkable and entirely consistent with the law of this liquidation.

In fact, Your Honor acknowledged in your Fairfield decision that quote, the Trustee may recover avoided transfers from an initial transferee or a subsequent transferee and need not seek recovery first from the initial transferee.

And while recognizing that the Trustee is limited by Section 550(d) to only a single satisfaction of an avoided transfer, Your Honor noted that whether the Trustee had been fully satisfied is an issue to be determined at a later stage of this litigation. And that's Your Honor's decision at 2021 Westlaw 3477479 at page 10.

Likewise, the Court in Merkin, this Court in

Merkin provided a similar illustrated example and that shows

that the -- that really shows that the defendant's charts

attached to Mr. Levin's declaration and all the arguments

about mathematical impossibility are irrelevant and

premature.

There, the Court stated an example and said, for example, if an initial fraudulent transfer of \$1 is subsequently transferred ten times from transferee one to transferee two from two to three and three to four, et cetera, the Trustee can sue each transferee for \$1. For this reason, the aggregate subsequent transfer claim can greatly exceed the amount of the initial transfer.

Nevertheless, the Trustee is entitled to only one satisfaction under Section 550(d) and in the Court's example can collect no more -- on account -- no more than \$1 on account of the initial fraudulent transfer.

So, Your Honor, given that the complaint need only plausible allege that some portion of the substantive

transfer is comprised of customer property, it is entirely plausible and highly likely that the aggregate demand amounts of all the subsequent transfer cases would exceed the \$3 billion in initial transfers to the Fairfield Funds.

And that fact in no way supports defendant's faulty logic that through simple arithmetic it can demonstrate that the initial transfers were exhausted on the face of any particular complaint.

In fact, in Merkin, even at an individual case level, this Court could not engage in the mathematical exercise that the defendant argues for here because it was unnecessary. The Court reviewed certain transfers identified in the complaint. And once it determined that a portion of those subsequent transfers were funded with customer property, that ended the inquiry. And the Court denied the motion.

To be exact, Your Honor, of the nearly 290 subsequent transfers at issue in that case, the Court actually focused and analyzed only a handful, less than ten, to determine that the subsequent transfers at issue were comprised of customer property.

What the Court did not do was to go on and aggregate all the initial transfers and then determine whether the total subsequent transfers exceeded the total amount of initial transfers. And that's because the Trustee

met the standard there, just as he has done here.

And now, Your Honor, I would take us through the complaint to demonstrate how the Trustee has met the appropriate standard in this action and how he plausibly alleged that approximately 15 million .9 -- excuse me, 15. million -- \$9 million in subsequent transfers are comprised of BLMIS customer property.

And just to be clear, the standard and his burden to recover the subsequent transfers, as articulated by this Court in Merkin, he must allege facts that support the inference that the funds at issue originated with the debtor and contained the necessary vital statistics, the who, when, and how much of the purported transfers to establish an entity as a subsequent transferee of the funds.

The Court also made clear that the complaint need only support the inference that a portion of the subsequent transfer originated with BLMIS. Like the instant case, the Trustee is not required to connect each of the subsequent transfers with an initial avoidable transfer emanating from BLMIS or a prior subsequent transfer originating with the initial transfer.

So, Your Honor, let's look at the complaint. The complaint alleges that Banque SYZ received transfers identified by date and amount from Sentry and that Sentry invested substantially all of its funds with BLMIS. That's

stated in the complaint at paragraph 63 through 70, Exhibits I, J and K.

The complaint likewise alleges that Banque SYZ received transfers identified by date and amount from Sigma and that Sigma invested all of its funds with Sentry and that's at the complaint at paragraph 71 through 74, Exhibits L and M.

So Mr. Levin directed Your Honor to his chart at page 33. I'd like to take another look at that with Your Honor and focus on it for a moment. And although it seeks to show the implausibility of the Trustee's customer property allegations, I submit it actually demonstrates how the Trustee satisfies his burden.

It illustrates that the complete -- excuse me. It illustrates that the complaint and its exhibits detail the vital statistics and the relevant pathways through which customer property flowed from BLMIS to Sentry and ultimately to the defendant.

If you look at the first column it details the dates and amounts totaling \$1.315 million that BLMIS transferred to Sentry between May 2003 and March of 2007.

And the dates and the amounts of approximately \$15.5 million Sentry transferred to the defendant.

It clearly shows that the Trustee has alleged that at least some portion of the subsequent transfers Banque SYZ

received originated with BLMIS. For example, the May 15, 2006 transfer to defendant in an amount of \$332,185 occurred shortly after Sentry received a \$120 million transfer from BLMIS on April 13th, 2006.

Now, I submit, Your Honor, while it is not required at this stage of the case and is beyond what the Trustee is required to plead, the linkage that the defendant claims is so vital to the Trustee's case and lacking in their view on the face of the complaint, is readily apparent based on defendant's own illustration of what is stated in the complaint.

It is certainly plausible that some portion of the \$120 million transfer from BLMIS to Sentry funded the \$332,000 transfer from Sentry to SYZ just over 30 days later. And, Your Honor, I would submit that alone is reason to deny defendant's motion to dismiss on this point.

Unless Your Honor has questions on -- actually,

Your Honor, I apologize, I'd just like to rebut something

about what Mr. Levin talked about having the documents in

our possession and that somehow, you know, we are prejudiced

or our claims should be enhanced.

That is not the case. We -- as my colleague Mr.

Feil said, we do not have all the documents and what is -
the exercise that is ultimately going to be required here is

well beyond just reviewing that, bank documents, it goes

beyond that the Trustee does not have anywhere near complete set of the Fairfield bank records.

In addition, the ultimate tracing will involve the relationship between the parties. We'll rely on records showing SYZ's course of business and how redemptions went from Sentry to SYZ and records which will be produced in discovery. Those are some of the -- I mean, those are some of the gaps that we have and I just wanted to point that out since we've heard repeatedly today that the Trustee has all the documents it needs to, you know, engage in the tracing exercise, which is inappropriate at this stage in any event.

Unless Your Honor has further questions on customer property, I'll move on to the final point which is personal jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Please, go right ahead. Thank you.

MR. CREMONA: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I submit that it is appropriate and reasonable for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over this defendant based on its extensive contacts with this forum, and purposeful availment of the benefits and protection of this jurisdiction, which contacts this Court has previously held sufficient for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

Once more here, this defendant opened an account with BLMIS for purposes of directly investing with Madoff in

New York and did invest with BLMIS for a period of nearly two years, from March of '07 through December of '08.

related to that direct account and participated in this liquidation proceeding in an effort to recoup asserted losses based on its direct investment with BLMIS, each of which provides this Court with an independent basis to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant beyond the usual minimal contacts that have alone been sufficient under this Court's holding in BLI.

So although we've discussed it a fair amount today, I would just briefly, Your Honor, I would like to start with the guiding principles enunciated by Judge Lifland in BLI, where he appropriate -- he appropriately exercised personal jurisdiction over a Fairfield investor under the identical facts to the case here.

So Judge Lifland focused on the following facts.

BLI signed the subscription agreement with Fairfield that

expressly incorporated a private placement memorandum that

highlighted the following, the prominent role of New York

based BLMIS' investment strategy, that BLMIS would retain

custody of at least 95 percent of the funds' assets in the

United States, the parties agreed to New York choice of law

in forum selection clauses.

The agreement required that all subscription

payments from BLI to Fairfield pass through Fairfield's New York account at HSBC and that BLI's redemption payments from Fairfield were processed through its own New York bank account.

So on the basis of the foregoing facts, all of which are present in this case, Judge Lifland held that jurisdiction was appropriate because BLI purposefully availed itself to the benefits and protections of New York, New York laws by knowing, intending and contemplating that the substantial majority of funds invested in Fairfield would be transferred to BLMIS in New York to be invested in New York in the securities market.

So, Your Honor, I submit that the facts of the instant case dictate the exact same result. And while that is enough, I would like to point out some additional bases in our complaint.

As stated in paragraphs 38 -- excuse me, as stated in paragraphs 7 and 38 of the complaint SYZ opened and maintained a direct account with BLMIS. That's account number 1FR126 and used New York banks to transfer funds into and receive monies from BLMIS, including the BLMIS 703 account at JPMorgan Chase.

In addition, paragraph 24 of the complaint states that Banque SYZ executed the customer agreement and all necessary account opening documents for purposes of its

account with BLMIS and delivered those documents to the head
-- to the New York headquarters.

And just before I move on, Your Honor, I want to rebut something that Mr. Levin said. You know, he talked about extra complaint allegations and all sorts of documents that were attached to our papers beyond the complaint.

However, as we cited in our papers it is entirely appropriate for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction through affidavits and supporting materials that contain averments of facts outside the pleadings.

We cited to a Second Circuit case, 624 F3d 123, these pleadings and affidavits are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all doubts in plaintiff's favor. Again that's the Queen Bee case, Second Circuit, 616 F3d 158.

I would also point that Judge Lifland found exactly the same in BLI when he noted that a Court may resolve disputed jurisdictional facts -- excuse me, the Court may resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues by reference to evidence outside the pleading, such as affidavits and consider all pertinent documentation submitted by the parties. And that's BLI, 480 B.R. at 510.

And with that, Your Honor, I'll walk through some of the documents that are attached to my declaration, which establish that it was SYZ that opened the account.

In addition to the allegations at -- my declaration at ECF 164, Exhibit 12, as I said make quite clear that SYZ opened the account on its own behalf. As you'll see at Exhibit 12, all of the account opening documents were signed by Banque SYZ, including the customer agreement with absolutely no reference to ISOS.

Every related account statement was addressed to SYZ with no reference to ISOS for the entire duration of the account. In the BLMIS customer agreement, which was signed by SYZ, Banque SYZ represented that no other person or entity had an interest in the customer account.

BLMIS only communicated with Eric Syz and other
Banque SYZ representatives regarding the customer account,
and SYZ representative, not ISOS directed the wire transfers
into the customer accounts, asked questions regarding
purported trades on the statements, and trade confirmations,
and all -- and signed all the trading authorizations.

I would also just like to rebut something we heard from Mr. Levin. He referenced the IRS form that was attached to his declaration. You know, we heard him talk about how that demonstrates that SYZ was acting as an intermediary and not on its own behalf. And that somehow negates all the documentation that I just recited and which was in the customer account file with BLMIS.

He quotes from this form and he did earlier in his

presentation. To that effect, Your Honor, it is not clear to me what this form even shows, but what is clear, is what it doesn't show.

The form is mainly blank and does not list the relevant account as its supposed to in line 8. No where is SYZ's quote/unquote disclosed principal mentioned in this form, and if anything, all it possibly creates is an issue of fact that can only be resolved after discovery, such as who had dominion and control over the funds.

There are just a number of issues. But what's most important, the Trustee when reviewing the debtor's books and records would have no way to know that based on -- that this somehow created an account relationship or a customer relationship. He would have no way to know that when he determined that SYZ was the customer under SIPA.

And I would also like to address this agency argument that is now being espoused by Mr. Levin here today. And really for the first time on reply. No such agency argument was made in the motion.

SYZ mentioned only that, quote, it opened the account for ISOS with BLMIS on or around March 7, 2007 and that's at the motion at page 38. And that SYZ opened the BLMIS account in a custodial capacity for its customer ISOS.

For the first time on reply, SYZ contends that it acted as an agent for ISOS when it filed the claim and it

opened the BLMIS account in its own name, devoting three pages to the point in its reply at page 14 through 16, now claiming their relationship is quote/unquote agency in a nutshell. None of this was in the motion to dismiss, Your Honor.

So in the first instance, I would ask Your Honor to disregard this argument in its entirety because it was asserted for the first time on reply. And if Your Honor is inclined I'm happy to provide some authority that argument is first raised in the reply, should not be properly considered, since this is the first time we've had an opportunity to respond to it.

THE COURT: Mr. Levin, what say you?

MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, I would have to go through on the fly right now, and detail the Trustee's allegations on jurisdiction in his opposition. He's -- this argument about agency was made specifically in reply to the Trustee's allegation about who the customer was in this account.

And we said the documents that Mr. Cremona submitted made clear that it is an agency account. And therefore, I think it is proper in the reply, it's not like we just made this up. We came to this late.

We made the arguments we did on jurisdiction in the initial proceeding. Again, I'm going to have to --

THE COURT: Mr. Cremona, I'll tell you what, we're

Page 146 going to make it very narrow. You file your brief on the very, very narrow issue of the ones which you think he -that Mr. Levin brought up today, and Mr. Levin, then you reply to that. MR. LEVIN: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: So --MR. LEVIN: (indiscernible) for that? MR. CREMONA: I mean, Your Honor, I -- Your Honor, I'm also happy to respond as well on the agency point and I have authority to that effect which I can do right now as well. THE COURT: Five pages each. Make it short and simple. MR. LEVIN: Yeah, Your Honor, I think what you were referring to was the agency point which Mr. Cremona is addressing. Was there something else that Mr. Cremona --THE COURT: Mr. Cremona, are we missing something? MR. CREMONA: Well, Your Honor, I was -- what I said is I'd be inclined to provide you with the authority on agency as well that it's premature and inappropriate on a motion to dismiss, which I'm happy to do right now. THE COURT: No, I thought we were only dealing with what Mr. -- I thought the only thing we were dealing in right now and, Mr. Levin, I heard you, but we're dealing with supposedly you brought up a defense in oral argument

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Page 147 1 and Mr. Cremona says that I shouldn't be ruling on that or 2 not ruling on it, it shouldn't be allowed. It was a very 3 narrow issue. Mr. Cremona --MR. CREMONA: Sure. 4 5 THE COURT: -- am I right? 6 MR. CREMONA: Just to be clear, Your Honor, and I 7 don't want to confuse matters. What I'm saying is, in Mr. 8 Levin -- in the defendant's motion to dismiss they made 9 perhaps two line references to a purported agency 10 relationship, they never made an argument that they were the 11 agent. They said they were -- they filed -- they did --12 THE COURT: You were making a legal argument about 13 something, so I don't need to go into that detail. I just 14 want the memo on the legal arguments you made, and Mr. 15 Levin, your response to that legal argument. You can point 16 to it and do you need memos on it? Is this with ISO? 17 MR. CREMONA: It is, yes, Your Honor, and I guess 18 the specific narrow issue is whether or not it's appropriate 19 to consider an argument that was raised for the first time 20 on reply. MR. LEVIN: Your Honor, I'm trying to understand 21 22 here whether --23 THE COURT: I am too because let me tell you, Mr. 24 Levin, I'm really wanting to get this opinion out. We've 25 got so many more in the queue, I want to get this one out

Page 148 1 quickly. 2 MR. CREMONA: Your Honor, I'm happy to move 3 forward. THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. CREMONA: I think I'd just like to make my 6 next point which I think resolves the issue. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. CREMONA: So even if the Court was inclined to 9 consider defendant's agency argument which are beyond the 10 allegations in the complaint, I think they should be 11 disregarded in any event, because the scope of an agency 12 relationship is a question not properly resolvable on a 13 motion to dismiss. That's a fact intensive inquiry and that's clear in the law in this circuit. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. Let's leave it there then. 16 don't want memos. 17 MR. CREMONA: Understood. Thank you, Your Honor. 18 So with that, I would conclude this by saying, SYZ's direct 19 account and investment with BLMIS provides yet another 20 significant contact and conduct establishing a clear New York nexus in favor of this Court exercising personal 21 22 jurisdiction over this defendant. 23 And there is one final independent basis for jurisdiction here. That is, Your Honor, that SYZ filed the 24 25 customer claim on its own behalf. And looking to the

complaint, the complaint adequately pled that SYZ filed the customer claim in the SIPA proceeding seeking to recover funds it allegedly lost on its investment in BLMIS, which has not been -- yet been determined, whereby it submitted to this Court's jurisdiction. And that's alleged at paragraph 883 and 93 of the complaint.

And what I would say, Your Honor, is that SYZ's reliance on the claim form itself does nothing to undermine these well pleaded allegations. The fact remains that the end notes in the claim form do not change that the claim was signed by SYZ and filed on its behalf, nor does it retroactively change the account opening documents and all the course of dealing directly with BLMIS as the direct account holder, the very account the claim relates to.

The filing of that claim and SYZ's active participation in the claims process seeking the benefit from the Trustee's recoveries in this liquidation most certainly confer this Court with jurisdiction on that independent basis.

That claim remains outstanding and will be appropriately resolved within this adversary proceeding pursuant to the 502(d) count.

And just to rebut something that Mr. Levin said that somehow the claim does not relate to this adversary proceeding, it most certainly does. The claimant is SYZ, by

operation of law, 502(d) applies to that and it will be resolved as part of this adversary proceeding.

And as a result, by the way, that confers this

Court with final adjudicated authority over the action under

the principles of Katchen v Landy and the other related

cases cited in our papers.

Lastly, Your Honor, I would just turn to the plausibility of the allegations regarding the 502(d) count. The complaint plausibly alleges that Banque SYZ filed the customer claim on its account and received stolen customer property, therefore, the customer claim must be denied pursuant to 502(d).

Again, looking at the complaint, the Trustee adequately pled that the customer claim should be temporarily disallowed pursuant to 502(d) at paragraphs 83 and 93 through 94. And having alleged that SYZ is the customer with a direct account with BLMIS, that it filed the related claim for its own account is the recipient of avoidable and recoverable transfers of customer property. And has yet to return those transfers to the Trustee, it follows that the claim must be disallowed as a matter of law.

For all those reasons, Your Honor, Banque SYZ's motion to dismiss Count II should be denied and the customer claims should be disallowed.

THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Levin.

MR. LEVIN: Thank you, Your Honor. And I'd like

to start where Mr. Cremona did on a point of personal

5 that my client could retain stolen customer property. I

privilege, with his remark that I was making arguments so

6 don't think that's quite appropriate in a court like this
7 and I'll move on.

8 THE COURT: It was an editorial comment and I 9 know, so move on.

MR. LEVIN: First, he says -- I'll take the arguments in the order he gave them. He said that we conceded that incorporation by reference was appropriate in this case because several of our arguments with affirmative defenses relied on the allegations of the Fairfield amended complaint.

But in fact, on page 15 of our motion, if I can turn to that, on page 15 of our motion we specifically said if this Court denies our motion with respect to Rule 8(a) and 10(c) then we will address what's in the Fairfield amended complaint. That's on 15 to 16. So we have not conceded that it is appropriate.

Second, Mr. Cremona relied on the Geiger case, which we both cited in our papers, saying that the incorporation by reference from one adversary proceeding to another adversary proceeding was appropriate.

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We disagree with that ruling but we understand that. But the important point here is even if the Court were to accept that position, Geiger struck the incorporation by reference because the incorporated complaint did not contain a short and plain statement of the grounds entitling the plaintiff to relief.

So I'm happy to have him rely on Geiger, because that's exactly the facts of this case. He says the district court found that incorporation by reference was appropriate, we addressed that in our papers. I'm not going to go over it in detail.

He says that the judicial notice of a decision is appropriate. Sure. But it's not what they're alleging.

It's -- they're trying to say that the Court decided something and therefore that's our allegation, but it's not in the complaint. So, you know, we address that in our papers.

And I never claimed that the Trustee has not alleged actual knowledge by Sentry. I recognize the Court's decision in the Fairfield Investment Fund case, that the Court held that the Fairfield second amended complaint, not the first one that's incorporated in ours, but that's okay, I'll give a little -- I have a little give on that one.

But the second amended complaint adequately alleged actual knowledge. I'm not challenging that here.

So I don't know where Mr. Cremona got that statement from.

That's -- let me move on to Section 550(b), the good faith defense. He says that a fact driven issue, but as I pointed out, the Citibank decision makes that purely a hypothetical case. And to the extent that Judge McMahon's opinion in BNP suggests otherwise, it doesn't really grapple with the issue, instead falling back on what we would consider a more common pre-Citibank understanding of the term good faith, which looks at what the defendant might or might not have known or thought.

Moving on to 546(e). Let's see. There are -- if you look at the potential actual knowledge of an initial transferee and a subsequent transferee, there are four possibilities of actual knowledge that Madoff wasn't traded securities.

Initial transferee knew, subsequent transferee knew. Initial transferee knew, subsequent transferee didn't know. Subsequent transferee knew, initial transferee didn't know. You know, you can make a matrix of these.

Judge Rakoff addressed only the initial transferee knew whether or not the subsequent -- I'm sorry. The initial transferee knew and the subsequent transferee knew and he addressed initial transferee was innocent and subsequent transferee knew.

He didn't address the initial transferee knew and

subsequent transferee did not know. But all the language in his complaint -- in his opinion suggests that the protected securities market that transaction should be protected and that's what we've got here.

I also pointed about the -- okay. Nothing further on that.

Customer property. Mr. Cremona said that our argument on this should be confined to the four corners of the complaint. Of course, when it comes to the incorporation by reference, he says that Geiger says that the entire SIPA proceeding is one proceeding. And the Court can look at everything within that proceeding.

And if that's the case, the Court may indeed look at the 70 some other complaints and we noted those, we attached those in our request for judicial notice as to what the Trustee had alleged.

He says that Judge Bernstein looked at the possibility of \$1 being transferred to subsequent transferee A, subsequent transferee B, subsequent transferee C and so on up to ten subsequent transferees and the Trustee could sue each one. That's not this fact, that's not this case.

This case is the \$1 transferred to the initial transferee -- the initial transferee. And then subsequent transferee at that same point in time transferring \$10 to ten different subsequent transferees, they can't all have

received customer property. It's not a chain. It was a simultaneous -- or it's not simultaneous. It was -- in some cases it was simultaneous. In others, it was more like transferred to multiple subsequent transferees not in a chain with each other.

He noted that the Sentry offering memorandum, said that it invested all of its Sentry funds with Madoff and therefore anything that Sentry paid out to its investors must have been customer property.

Well, there's a logical fallacy in that. Sentry - because Sentry was going to take money that it received
and invested with customer property, that doesn't mean that
it didn't get any money from other -- I'm sorry. That it
didn't get money from other sources besides withdrawals from
Madoff.

And we show in our papers, it can't be that it received 2.9 million -- billion from Madoff and paid out 7 billion to others and all of that \$7 billion was 2.9. That is, you know, spinning gold out of straw. It just can't be.

Mr. Cremona focused on our March 20, '07 transfer.

Admittedly that was right after a transfer from BLMIS to

Sentry. Our main focus here was on the transfer of the

\$13.5 or so million nine months after the last prior initial

transfer, and the Court shouldn't be distracted by that

small subsequent transfer when the real focus is on the

large earlier transfer.

Finally on jurisdiction. Mr. Cremona keeps stressing Banque SYZ's direct investment with Madoff. When the papers show that it was investing as agent. All I can suggest is if I were the -- an officer of a corporation and the corporation opened an account and I signed all the documents, I would be the agent of that corporation, but that doesn't mean it's my account.

SYZ itself was the agent of ISOS and made that clear in Madoff's documents, both in the document cited in Mr. Cremona's declaration, the -- where the -- how the account name should read when it was opened.

I apologize, I had that in front of me, that's on page -- that's Exhibit 11, page 8 and 10 of his declaration, Exhibit 11, pages 8 and 10. And then in the proof of claim it was clear that SYZ was filing it as an agent.

We're not talking about the scope of the agency relationship here. It's not whether the agent had -- scope of agency usually has to do with whether the agent had authority to enter into whatever transaction. There's no dispute here that Banque SYZ had authority to enter into this transaction for ISOS.

But it did so as an agent and that does not subject SYZ to personal jurisdiction for things that occurred months and years prior because they were part of

the same transaction. Nor does it make 502(d) applicable.

I searched long and hard, Your Honor, for a case in which an agent had received a voidable transfer and his principal had filed a claim against the debtor. That's the facts of this case. I could not find one.

But 502(d) talks about whether the avoidable transfer was returned by the recipient and a proof of claim by that recipient, by the claimant, here the claimant is ISOS filed by its agent Banque SYZ.

Finally, on the affidavits outside the pleadings, yes, of course, courts can look to documents outside the pleadings to determine jurisdiction, but not, not where the complaint simply alleges in conclusory terms the Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant period or the defendant purposefully availed itself of the United States or with investment in the United States period. And now let's use that as a wedge to open up discovery and put in a lot of additional material. The complaint itself must be plausible and set forth a plausible basis for jurisdiction.

Nothing further, Your Honor, unless you have any questions.

THE COURT: No, I do not. Mr. Cremona, anything you wish to add that is put only on what was just addressed by Mr. Levin?

MR. CREMONA: Your Honor, I'll be extremely brief.

One, on the Geiger case, those limitations that Mr. Levin just referred to do not apply. There were two aspects of that incorporation, one was a motion that was attempted to be incorporated and one was the complaint for declaratory judgment and that complaint was incorporated.

Second, my understanding of the law, you know, Mr. Levin's request to incorporate by reference, 80 other complaints is not appropriate. The face of the complaint is what governs here. What we did is by expressly referencing one complaint in paragraph 63, that is appropriate and that's a big distinction.

The point about the account was opened for ISOS, nothing in the documentation shows that. There was one REF ISOS, I would submit to Your Honor that that does not negate the 12 to 18 months of statements that show who the account holder was, and that no where in the documentation is ISOS referenced.

And the last point on the claim, you simply cannot rewrite history by filing a proof of claim and you did so claiming on an agent, or that that person was the customer. The customer is determined as Your Honor knows, as we cited in our cases by the Morgan Kennedy factors, the Kruse case, Aozora, whether or not the person entrusted cash or securities with the broker dealer for the purpose of purchasing securities, ISOS never did that, SYZ did that,

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     SYZ is the customer. That's all I have, thank you.
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                THE COURT: Thank you. Thank y'all very much. I
 3
     enjoy -- I enjoy y'all very much. I will issue a written
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     decision and have a good day.
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                MR. CREMONA: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                MR. LEVIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Thanks, everyone.
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      (Proceedings concluded at 1:21 p.m.)
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Page 160 1 CERTIFICATION 2 I, Sheila G. Orms, certify that the foregoing is a 3 correct transcript from the official electronic sound 4 5 recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 6 7 Signature of Approved Transcriber 8 9 Dated: May 26, 2022 10 11 12 13 14 15 VERITEXT 16 330 Old Country Road 17 Suite 300 18 Mineola, NY 11501 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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